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al-Sharifs killer Elor Azraya
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Abdel Fattah al-Sharif 21
Ramsey Qasrawi 21 March 24 2016 |
19 sept 2016
According to IDF principles, a soldier will not be prosecuted for an operational error, regardless of the gravity of its results. However, that does not mean that he should be backed by the IDF and defense establishment.
The Elor Azaria affair is still making headlines. Last week, Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman said that even if it turns out that the soldier made a mistake when he shot an already-neutralized Palestinian terrorist to death in Hebron, he should be backed.
What is backing, who should be backed, how will the backing be expressed and what does backing have to do with avoiding prosecution?
The Israel Defense Forces is supposed to operate under four principles. First, a soldier will not be prosecuted for an operational error, regardless of the gravity of its results. That does not mean that he will be backed. There have been many cases in which officers were dismissed following a serious operational failure. They were not backed but they were not prosecuted either, as their mistake was not caused by a criminal intention or a desire to violate orders. Avoiding prosecution and backing are, therefore, not the same thing.
Second, despite what I wrote in my previous piece, the army should be as patient as possible towards good officers or soldiers who were responsible for an operational failure. Too many dismissals following operational failures are a mistake and could negatively affect morale in the army and could even cause commanders to be afraid to take initiative. Moreover, many mistakes have been the result of complacency. Someone who has already experienced a failure personally will avoid repeating the mistake, as compared to others.
This was well understood by one of the greatest military leaders of the 20th century, and one of the toughest, Georgy Zhukov. This man, who was responsible for most of the Russians' great victories in World War II, confronted Soviet leader Joseph Stalin in November 1941. Stalin wanted to dismiss and even execute General Konev for his failure to defend the Moscow front. Zhukov wanted Konev to be his deputy, and managed to convince Stalin by saying that it would be better to have a person who had already learned from his mistakes in the senior position than someone else who would repeat them.
Third, regardless of a command procedure (dismissal or no dismissal), a soldier is not prosecuted if he made a judgment error or read the situation wrong and acted accordingly – as long as the operational investigation finds that the soldier did not have any ulterior motives.
Fourth, a soldier is not prosecuted just because he acted against orders. Moreover, we even expect a soldier to act against orders under certain circumstances. Here's a trivial example: A soldier is sent with a vehicle from the base to deliver equipment to a unit engaged in a training session. He is given explicit orders to drive straight, not to make any stops and to reach his destination by 12 pm. On his way, he witnesses a serious road accident, sees a vehicle lying on its roof at the side of the road and hears people screaming inside. The soldier looks at his watch and realizes that if he stops to help the passengers, he will both violate the order he received (not to make any stops) and arrive late. Nonetheless, he is expected to act against the orders and help rescue the injured.
The fundamental justification for deviating from an explicit order and acting against it is based on one consideration: The soldier must ask himself whether, according to his best judgment, the commander who gave him the mission would have allowed him to rescue the injured or stuck to the initial mission had he been present at the scene of the accident. If it seems reasonable to him that his commander would have changed his orders in that case, then it is not just his right to violate the order, but his duty, and he will clearly not be prosecuted.
That is one of the weak points in Elor Azaria's arguments. He cannot argue that what he did was what he thought his commanders would have expected him to do, as his commander had been present during the incident. He had the option of asking him, but refrained from doing so.
The Elor Azaria affair is still making headlines. Last week, Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman said that even if it turns out that the soldier made a mistake when he shot an already-neutralized Palestinian terrorist to death in Hebron, he should be backed.
What is backing, who should be backed, how will the backing be expressed and what does backing have to do with avoiding prosecution?
The Israel Defense Forces is supposed to operate under four principles. First, a soldier will not be prosecuted for an operational error, regardless of the gravity of its results. That does not mean that he will be backed. There have been many cases in which officers were dismissed following a serious operational failure. They were not backed but they were not prosecuted either, as their mistake was not caused by a criminal intention or a desire to violate orders. Avoiding prosecution and backing are, therefore, not the same thing.
Second, despite what I wrote in my previous piece, the army should be as patient as possible towards good officers or soldiers who were responsible for an operational failure. Too many dismissals following operational failures are a mistake and could negatively affect morale in the army and could even cause commanders to be afraid to take initiative. Moreover, many mistakes have been the result of complacency. Someone who has already experienced a failure personally will avoid repeating the mistake, as compared to others.
This was well understood by one of the greatest military leaders of the 20th century, and one of the toughest, Georgy Zhukov. This man, who was responsible for most of the Russians' great victories in World War II, confronted Soviet leader Joseph Stalin in November 1941. Stalin wanted to dismiss and even execute General Konev for his failure to defend the Moscow front. Zhukov wanted Konev to be his deputy, and managed to convince Stalin by saying that it would be better to have a person who had already learned from his mistakes in the senior position than someone else who would repeat them.
Third, regardless of a command procedure (dismissal or no dismissal), a soldier is not prosecuted if he made a judgment error or read the situation wrong and acted accordingly – as long as the operational investigation finds that the soldier did not have any ulterior motives.
Fourth, a soldier is not prosecuted just because he acted against orders. Moreover, we even expect a soldier to act against orders under certain circumstances. Here's a trivial example: A soldier is sent with a vehicle from the base to deliver equipment to a unit engaged in a training session. He is given explicit orders to drive straight, not to make any stops and to reach his destination by 12 pm. On his way, he witnesses a serious road accident, sees a vehicle lying on its roof at the side of the road and hears people screaming inside. The soldier looks at his watch and realizes that if he stops to help the passengers, he will both violate the order he received (not to make any stops) and arrive late. Nonetheless, he is expected to act against the orders and help rescue the injured.
The fundamental justification for deviating from an explicit order and acting against it is based on one consideration: The soldier must ask himself whether, according to his best judgment, the commander who gave him the mission would have allowed him to rescue the injured or stuck to the initial mission had he been present at the scene of the accident. If it seems reasonable to him that his commander would have changed his orders in that case, then it is not just his right to violate the order, but his duty, and he will clearly not be prosecuted.
That is one of the weak points in Elor Azaria's arguments. He cannot argue that what he did was what he thought his commanders would have expected him to do, as his commander had been present during the incident. He had the option of asking him, but refrained from doing so.
Left to Right: Dan Biton, Uzi Dayan, Shmuel Zakai
Former Deputy Chief of Staff Uzi Dayan says Sgt. Azaria was ‘judged on Facebook. His right to innocence was mowed down;’ second senior witness slams prosecutor for creating a climate in which ‘every soldier would have to go to battle with a lawyer. You are castrating the army.’
The trial of Sgt. Elor Azaria—who was indicted for manslaughter after he was captured on camera shooting an already neutralized Palestinian terrorist, Abed al Fatah al-Sharif, in Hebron—continued Monday afternoon at a special military court in Jaffa.
Two IDF reserve generals—former Deputy Chief of Staff Uzi Dayan and head of the IDF Technological and Logistics Directorate Ret. Maj. Gen. Dan Biton—provided testimony for the defense team in which they propounded that Azaria’s actions were justified.
Only moments elapsed before an argument broke out between Dayan—who took to the witness stand first—and Prosecutor Lt. Col. Nadav Weisman and defense attorney Illan Katz.
Dayan, the most senior officer to have testified in the trial thus far, began by calling into question the expertise and experience of the Criminal Investigation Division (CID), stating that it was unfit to investigate such trials.
“The CID doesn’t have, in my opinion, the experience or the authority to investigate operational incidents,” said Dayan, triggering an instant rebuttal from Weisman who cited questionable instances investigated by the CID which occurred under his command.
The reference prompted attorney Katz to thump the table and shout, “Dayan in not a criminal,” before Dayan himself said, “I have just as much experience as you in security incidents.”
After a series of back-and-forths, the focus returned to Azaria. “I am sufficiently knowledgeable on the criminal law to wonder about his guilt. If we are talking about malice, then there needs to be a murder indictment,” said Dayan. “Manslaughter is... unclear. I don’t know whether Azaria did wrong or not. His right to innocence has been mowed down. He was judged on Facebook. I submitted my opinion and concerns about the influence of this on soldiers in the field. Every day of the trial damages the IDF and influences soldiers.”
At one point during his testimony, Dayan grew impatient with the prosecutor’s questions. “I have given orders to kill terrorists with no connection to the question in the same moment about whether there was danger. Terrorists need to die. The fate of terrorists is to die. Even if you don’t know whether the person is a terrorist or not, you have an obligation to protect your life and that of others,” Dayan exclaimed.
At the end of the investigation, a number of questions were put before Dayan, who offered his take on the rules of engagement.
“The rules of engagement do not outweigh the mission or the orders received in the field. If the objective is to kill a terrorist in a cab in Gaza, I don’t operate according to the rules of engagement. If you are walking at night in Hebron and identify a terrorist carrying a weapon ... as a rule, you have to kill them. If you just report it instead, then he will be able to carry out an attack. He might be carrying a guitar and not a Kalashnikov, in which case the level of experience one has is extremely important. When it comes to terrorists, let their blood be on their own responsibility. It's a good result if they're dead."
Dan Biton then provided his testimony offering his expert opinion for the defense. Prosecutor Weisman immediately set about taking Biton to task for the fact that his opinion was almost identical to that of Brig. Gen. Shmuel Zakai, who was discharged from the army 12 years ago after then Chief-of-Staff Ya’alon accused him of leaking military information to the political echelon. Biton responded, “That is reasonable in my view.”
“He didn’t know if there was an explosive device on the terrorist or not. A quick movement by the terrorist is enough to (justify) shooting even if no other commander or soldier senses danger as determined by the instructions of the Operations Directorate. You are a military court and you are obliged to stick to military orders. It isn’t black or white. Because of you, the prosecutor, every military operation—even during war—will be put on trial, and that should not be the case.” said Biton.
He went on to accuse the commanders of shirking responsibility. “The commanders escaped from the their responsibility. Azaria did not participate in the military investigation. The commanders ran straight to the courts. You can’t latch on to things said by a soldier a minute or an hour after the shooting. It isn’t important what a 19-year-old soldier says when he is agitated,” Biton said.
“The feeling that you are in life-threatening danger at the scene and the pressure makes you act. I was in situations like that. If the soldier killed for no reason then he should sit in prison. In this instance I disagree with the prosecutor who is (creating a climate in which) every soldier would have to go to battle with a lawyer,” Biton concluded before leveling the accusation at Weisman, “You are castrating the army.”
After weeks of absence from the court proceedings due to a stroke, Sgt. Azaria’s father, Charlie Azaria, who was supported by those around him, arrived at the trial. Charlie hugged his son and cried during the court proceedings. At the session’s conclusion, Charlie hugged General Bitton and said, “I rise and I salute the generals who come here. We are a strong family and we will not be broken.”
Former Deputy Chief of Staff Uzi Dayan says Sgt. Azaria was ‘judged on Facebook. His right to innocence was mowed down;’ second senior witness slams prosecutor for creating a climate in which ‘every soldier would have to go to battle with a lawyer. You are castrating the army.’
The trial of Sgt. Elor Azaria—who was indicted for manslaughter after he was captured on camera shooting an already neutralized Palestinian terrorist, Abed al Fatah al-Sharif, in Hebron—continued Monday afternoon at a special military court in Jaffa.
Two IDF reserve generals—former Deputy Chief of Staff Uzi Dayan and head of the IDF Technological and Logistics Directorate Ret. Maj. Gen. Dan Biton—provided testimony for the defense team in which they propounded that Azaria’s actions were justified.
Only moments elapsed before an argument broke out between Dayan—who took to the witness stand first—and Prosecutor Lt. Col. Nadav Weisman and defense attorney Illan Katz.
Dayan, the most senior officer to have testified in the trial thus far, began by calling into question the expertise and experience of the Criminal Investigation Division (CID), stating that it was unfit to investigate such trials.
“The CID doesn’t have, in my opinion, the experience or the authority to investigate operational incidents,” said Dayan, triggering an instant rebuttal from Weisman who cited questionable instances investigated by the CID which occurred under his command.
The reference prompted attorney Katz to thump the table and shout, “Dayan in not a criminal,” before Dayan himself said, “I have just as much experience as you in security incidents.”
After a series of back-and-forths, the focus returned to Azaria. “I am sufficiently knowledgeable on the criminal law to wonder about his guilt. If we are talking about malice, then there needs to be a murder indictment,” said Dayan. “Manslaughter is... unclear. I don’t know whether Azaria did wrong or not. His right to innocence has been mowed down. He was judged on Facebook. I submitted my opinion and concerns about the influence of this on soldiers in the field. Every day of the trial damages the IDF and influences soldiers.”
At one point during his testimony, Dayan grew impatient with the prosecutor’s questions. “I have given orders to kill terrorists with no connection to the question in the same moment about whether there was danger. Terrorists need to die. The fate of terrorists is to die. Even if you don’t know whether the person is a terrorist or not, you have an obligation to protect your life and that of others,” Dayan exclaimed.
At the end of the investigation, a number of questions were put before Dayan, who offered his take on the rules of engagement.
“The rules of engagement do not outweigh the mission or the orders received in the field. If the objective is to kill a terrorist in a cab in Gaza, I don’t operate according to the rules of engagement. If you are walking at night in Hebron and identify a terrorist carrying a weapon ... as a rule, you have to kill them. If you just report it instead, then he will be able to carry out an attack. He might be carrying a guitar and not a Kalashnikov, in which case the level of experience one has is extremely important. When it comes to terrorists, let their blood be on their own responsibility. It's a good result if they're dead."
Dan Biton then provided his testimony offering his expert opinion for the defense. Prosecutor Weisman immediately set about taking Biton to task for the fact that his opinion was almost identical to that of Brig. Gen. Shmuel Zakai, who was discharged from the army 12 years ago after then Chief-of-Staff Ya’alon accused him of leaking military information to the political echelon. Biton responded, “That is reasonable in my view.”
“He didn’t know if there was an explosive device on the terrorist or not. A quick movement by the terrorist is enough to (justify) shooting even if no other commander or soldier senses danger as determined by the instructions of the Operations Directorate. You are a military court and you are obliged to stick to military orders. It isn’t black or white. Because of you, the prosecutor, every military operation—even during war—will be put on trial, and that should not be the case.” said Biton.
He went on to accuse the commanders of shirking responsibility. “The commanders escaped from the their responsibility. Azaria did not participate in the military investigation. The commanders ran straight to the courts. You can’t latch on to things said by a soldier a minute or an hour after the shooting. It isn’t important what a 19-year-old soldier says when he is agitated,” Biton said.
“The feeling that you are in life-threatening danger at the scene and the pressure makes you act. I was in situations like that. If the soldier killed for no reason then he should sit in prison. In this instance I disagree with the prosecutor who is (creating a climate in which) every soldier would have to go to battle with a lawyer,” Biton concluded before leveling the accusation at Weisman, “You are castrating the army.”
After weeks of absence from the court proceedings due to a stroke, Sgt. Azaria’s father, Charlie Azaria, who was supported by those around him, arrived at the trial. Charlie hugged his son and cried during the court proceedings. At the session’s conclusion, Charlie hugged General Bitton and said, “I rise and I salute the generals who come here. We are a strong family and we will not be broken.”
14 sept 2016
Dr. Dov Shimon
Op-ed: Dr. Dov Shimon's claims that the terrorist Sgt. Elor Azaria shot in Hebron was already dead are reminiscent of the claims made by doctors in the Bus 300 affair, who claimed the terrorists seen taken alive out of the bus were actually already dead. One guy can die without knowing it, but two?
Last week, Dr. Dov Shimon, a surgeon, testified in the trial of IDF soldier Elor Azaria. Dr. Shimon was summoned to give testimony on behalf of the defense to substantiate an opinion written by Professor Yehuda Hiss, the ousted head of the Abu Kabir Forensic Institute.
Prof. Hiss's hypothesis was simple: The terrorist, who had been shot by soldiers after attempting to stab them, immediately died of wounds sustained in that first shooting. When Azaria arrived at the scene 11 minutes later and shot the terrorist in the head—he shot a corpse. It's all a big misunderstanding.
"It's likely that the deceased's death was caused by an acute respiratory failure in conjunction with air embolisms to the heart and brain following an injury to the right lung by two bullets," wrote Hiss.
It reminded me of the Bus 300 affair. In April 1984, four Bedouin teenagers—all about 18 years old—hijacked an Egged bus on its way from Tel Aviv to Ashkelon. They demanded the release of hundreds of Fatah prisoners in exchange for the hostages on the bus. Sayeret Matkal commandos stormed the bus and killed two of the hijackers. The other two were captured and taken out of the bus. We, a small group of journalists, saw them at that point—beaten but very much alive. We also took their photos. Shortly thereafter, we were informed that they had died during the raid.
When a photo of the two living hijackers made the papers, and questions started popping up, two well-known doctors—one of whom was a recipient of the Israel Prize—wrote opinions that stated the two terrorists were dead when they were taken off the bus. The blows they suffered caused fatal damage to their internal organs. The Shin Bet agents didn't know this. So no one was to blame, really.
When I received that opinion from one of the suspects' lawyers, I couldn't believe it. One guy can die without knowing it, sure, but two? Two people dying and then keep on singing happens only in the opera.
The truth came out years later: The two were murdered in cold blood by Shin Bet agents. The storm within the Shin Bet and outside of it was so big that the medical opinions were all but forgotten. The doctors were not punished or reprimanded, their reputation was not tarnished, their fame did not die out.
The courts continued accepting professional opinions from doctors, economists, engineers, architects, and military officers in reserves. There is probably no better, more credible system. Normally, the judges are too polite to ask the honorable witnesses who exactly paid them and with whose coin.
From day one, the Azaria trial has been fought in two courts: The military one in Jaffa and that of public opinion. The fight in Jaffa is relatively simple: It focuses on evidence. The prosecutor, Lt. Col. Nadav Weisman, currently has the upper hand on that front. The fight for public opinion is far more complicated: In practice, it was already won the very first day. A poll by the Israel Democracy Institute found that 65 percent of Jews in Israel justify Azaria's actions, while 51 percent justify the soldiers who are threatening to stop serving if he is convicted.
Azaria's legal and political defense teams hope the verdict given by the court of public opinion influences the verdict given by the military court. Public opinion is their most effective weapon. For this very reason, the prosecution is worried.
On September 19, two major generals in reserves, Uzi Dayan and Dan Biton, will testify on behalf of the defense. On September 27, Brig. Gen. (res.) Shmuel Zakai will testify. The law requires expert witnesses to submit their professional opinions in writing ahead of their testimony in front of the court. The opinions submitted by Dayan and Biton were different to what they said on the topic to the press. The disparity tells us more about them than about the shooting in Hebron. Uzi Dayan prides himself on knowing how to recite all of Nathan Alterman's poems. He knows the lines, but he failed to internalize the core values the poems are based on.
There have been cases dealing with norms of fighting in the IDF from day one. It's easy to say that when it comes to this loaded issue, Israeli public opinion has changed: It's because of 49 years of occupation; it's because of the continuing right-wing regime; it's because of Netanyahu. It's easy to say that, but those might not exactly be the facts.
I had the honor of covering quite a few cases like this. Some of them I even broke myself. All of them featured massive disparities between IDF orders and the Israeli law on the one hand, and public opinion on the other.
When Rafael "Raful" Eitan was the IDF chief of staff, he exploited the power he was given to distort justice and send a message. In Raful's eyes, anyone who killed an Arab was innocent—even if the Arab was an innocent bystander or a captive bound hand and foot. An innocent civilian was murdered by an off-duty civil defense soldier on a main street in Jerusalem; bound captives were murdered in Lebanon. Raful mitigated the punishment of these murderers willy-nilly, setting them free. What's interesting is that he had the complete opposite views on looting. Looters were punished to the full extent of the law. The message was clear: Murder was okay, theft was not. Property was more precious than life.
The military judicial system refused to accept Raful's policies. The law was changed, and the IDF chief's pardon power was reduced. Later rulings by the High Court of Justice revoked the option from the IDF to settle for disciplinary action in such cases. The investigation is criminal in nature; the sentencing is handed out by the court.
Raful was a bold fighter and a failing IDF chief who left the IDF stranded in Lebanon for an entire generation. When it came to fighting norms, he adopted the ones he grew up on—what he learned from his father's actions and what he learned in the paratroopers in the 1950s. The pardons he handed out didn't hurt his position. On the contrary, the Israeli public loved him. He built an entire political career on that love.
Public opinion hasn't changed, the IDF's senior command did. The change is entirely for the better: The IDF today has more respect to the law, to instructions, to procedures, and more service awareness. In the past, there were those in the IDF who preferred soldiers and commanders operated within a cloud of ambiguity. Today, the high echelons of the IDF realize that clarity is vital for the military's operations. It's vital because of the dilemmas created by the occupation. In a state of ambiguity, the IDF will suffer.
The change for the worse is in the involvement of the public in the process. The Azaria trial is the first in which the influence of social media on the IDF's law enforcement was clearly felt. While in the past, officers and soldiers put on trial would ask their friends for money so they could afford good lawyers. Azaria doesn't need friends. His lawyers complained early in the trial that they were not compensated for their services, and then, in one fell swoop, social media helped raise over NIS 600,000 to foot their bill.
Op-ed: Dr. Dov Shimon's claims that the terrorist Sgt. Elor Azaria shot in Hebron was already dead are reminiscent of the claims made by doctors in the Bus 300 affair, who claimed the terrorists seen taken alive out of the bus were actually already dead. One guy can die without knowing it, but two?
Last week, Dr. Dov Shimon, a surgeon, testified in the trial of IDF soldier Elor Azaria. Dr. Shimon was summoned to give testimony on behalf of the defense to substantiate an opinion written by Professor Yehuda Hiss, the ousted head of the Abu Kabir Forensic Institute.
Prof. Hiss's hypothesis was simple: The terrorist, who had been shot by soldiers after attempting to stab them, immediately died of wounds sustained in that first shooting. When Azaria arrived at the scene 11 minutes later and shot the terrorist in the head—he shot a corpse. It's all a big misunderstanding.
"It's likely that the deceased's death was caused by an acute respiratory failure in conjunction with air embolisms to the heart and brain following an injury to the right lung by two bullets," wrote Hiss.
It reminded me of the Bus 300 affair. In April 1984, four Bedouin teenagers—all about 18 years old—hijacked an Egged bus on its way from Tel Aviv to Ashkelon. They demanded the release of hundreds of Fatah prisoners in exchange for the hostages on the bus. Sayeret Matkal commandos stormed the bus and killed two of the hijackers. The other two were captured and taken out of the bus. We, a small group of journalists, saw them at that point—beaten but very much alive. We also took their photos. Shortly thereafter, we were informed that they had died during the raid.
When a photo of the two living hijackers made the papers, and questions started popping up, two well-known doctors—one of whom was a recipient of the Israel Prize—wrote opinions that stated the two terrorists were dead when they were taken off the bus. The blows they suffered caused fatal damage to their internal organs. The Shin Bet agents didn't know this. So no one was to blame, really.
When I received that opinion from one of the suspects' lawyers, I couldn't believe it. One guy can die without knowing it, sure, but two? Two people dying and then keep on singing happens only in the opera.
The truth came out years later: The two were murdered in cold blood by Shin Bet agents. The storm within the Shin Bet and outside of it was so big that the medical opinions were all but forgotten. The doctors were not punished or reprimanded, their reputation was not tarnished, their fame did not die out.
The courts continued accepting professional opinions from doctors, economists, engineers, architects, and military officers in reserves. There is probably no better, more credible system. Normally, the judges are too polite to ask the honorable witnesses who exactly paid them and with whose coin.
From day one, the Azaria trial has been fought in two courts: The military one in Jaffa and that of public opinion. The fight in Jaffa is relatively simple: It focuses on evidence. The prosecutor, Lt. Col. Nadav Weisman, currently has the upper hand on that front. The fight for public opinion is far more complicated: In practice, it was already won the very first day. A poll by the Israel Democracy Institute found that 65 percent of Jews in Israel justify Azaria's actions, while 51 percent justify the soldiers who are threatening to stop serving if he is convicted.
Azaria's legal and political defense teams hope the verdict given by the court of public opinion influences the verdict given by the military court. Public opinion is their most effective weapon. For this very reason, the prosecution is worried.
On September 19, two major generals in reserves, Uzi Dayan and Dan Biton, will testify on behalf of the defense. On September 27, Brig. Gen. (res.) Shmuel Zakai will testify. The law requires expert witnesses to submit their professional opinions in writing ahead of their testimony in front of the court. The opinions submitted by Dayan and Biton were different to what they said on the topic to the press. The disparity tells us more about them than about the shooting in Hebron. Uzi Dayan prides himself on knowing how to recite all of Nathan Alterman's poems. He knows the lines, but he failed to internalize the core values the poems are based on.
There have been cases dealing with norms of fighting in the IDF from day one. It's easy to say that when it comes to this loaded issue, Israeli public opinion has changed: It's because of 49 years of occupation; it's because of the continuing right-wing regime; it's because of Netanyahu. It's easy to say that, but those might not exactly be the facts.
I had the honor of covering quite a few cases like this. Some of them I even broke myself. All of them featured massive disparities between IDF orders and the Israeli law on the one hand, and public opinion on the other.
When Rafael "Raful" Eitan was the IDF chief of staff, he exploited the power he was given to distort justice and send a message. In Raful's eyes, anyone who killed an Arab was innocent—even if the Arab was an innocent bystander or a captive bound hand and foot. An innocent civilian was murdered by an off-duty civil defense soldier on a main street in Jerusalem; bound captives were murdered in Lebanon. Raful mitigated the punishment of these murderers willy-nilly, setting them free. What's interesting is that he had the complete opposite views on looting. Looters were punished to the full extent of the law. The message was clear: Murder was okay, theft was not. Property was more precious than life.
The military judicial system refused to accept Raful's policies. The law was changed, and the IDF chief's pardon power was reduced. Later rulings by the High Court of Justice revoked the option from the IDF to settle for disciplinary action in such cases. The investigation is criminal in nature; the sentencing is handed out by the court.
Raful was a bold fighter and a failing IDF chief who left the IDF stranded in Lebanon for an entire generation. When it came to fighting norms, he adopted the ones he grew up on—what he learned from his father's actions and what he learned in the paratroopers in the 1950s. The pardons he handed out didn't hurt his position. On the contrary, the Israeli public loved him. He built an entire political career on that love.
Public opinion hasn't changed, the IDF's senior command did. The change is entirely for the better: The IDF today has more respect to the law, to instructions, to procedures, and more service awareness. In the past, there were those in the IDF who preferred soldiers and commanders operated within a cloud of ambiguity. Today, the high echelons of the IDF realize that clarity is vital for the military's operations. It's vital because of the dilemmas created by the occupation. In a state of ambiguity, the IDF will suffer.
The change for the worse is in the involvement of the public in the process. The Azaria trial is the first in which the influence of social media on the IDF's law enforcement was clearly felt. While in the past, officers and soldiers put on trial would ask their friends for money so they could afford good lawyers. Azaria doesn't need friends. His lawyers complained early in the trial that they were not compensated for their services, and then, in one fell swoop, social media helped raise over NIS 600,000 to foot their bill.
12 sept 2016
Speaking at Ariel University, Lieberman addresses ongoing trial of Sgt. Elor Azaria: 'I hope the military court will manage to ignore the noise and rule in accordance with the facts; we will support him even if he made a mistake.' Calls on PM to adopt principle of 'land exchanges.'
Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman spoke Monday evening at Ariel University, answering questions from students and local residents. He began his speech by talking about Sgt. Elor Azaria, who is currently on trial for manslaughter after being filmed in March shooting the already-neutralized Palestinian terrorist Abed al Fatah al-Sharif to death in Hebron.
"We should all – media people, public figures, and politicians as well – remember: Any person who has not been convicted in court is innocent. Especially when we are speaking about soldiers who are under pressure (and experiencing friction with) a hostile population."
"We must understand that maybe one of them makes a mistake. They're only 18-19 years old, and a year's grind produces results. Convicting before the trial is absurd. Sadly, many – in the political ranks as well – already convicted him before the trial. With us, its all backwards," he continued. "My call to the public at large and the military establishment is this: Do not convict in advance. A military judicial system has to rule without pressures, and I expect the military court to rule in accordance with the facts, regardless of the pressures from left and right and (ignoring) background noises."
Lieberman also said that Azaria deserved support whatever the conclusions of the legal proceeedings "We will stand by the soldier even if he made a mistake. We are committed to giving him all of the help (we can). It cannot be that soldiers in uniform become objects of politicians' attacks. People in uniform are the emissaries of the people of Israel."
The defense minister also called on Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to adopt the fundamental principle, for any future agreement with the Palestinians, of land swaps. “Why does the ‘Triangle’ (a group of Arab downs adjacent to the Green Line) and Umm al-Fahm need to be part of Israel?,” he asked the audience.
“Why do I need to subsidize Raed Salah and pay the salary of Hanin Zoabi? I do not understand why the prime minister will not adopt the core principle. The time has come for him and Likud to adopt the principle of land exchanges.”
This was Lieberman's first such Q&A since becoming defense minister in May.
Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman spoke Monday evening at Ariel University, answering questions from students and local residents. He began his speech by talking about Sgt. Elor Azaria, who is currently on trial for manslaughter after being filmed in March shooting the already-neutralized Palestinian terrorist Abed al Fatah al-Sharif to death in Hebron.
"We should all – media people, public figures, and politicians as well – remember: Any person who has not been convicted in court is innocent. Especially when we are speaking about soldiers who are under pressure (and experiencing friction with) a hostile population."
"We must understand that maybe one of them makes a mistake. They're only 18-19 years old, and a year's grind produces results. Convicting before the trial is absurd. Sadly, many – in the political ranks as well – already convicted him before the trial. With us, its all backwards," he continued. "My call to the public at large and the military establishment is this: Do not convict in advance. A military judicial system has to rule without pressures, and I expect the military court to rule in accordance with the facts, regardless of the pressures from left and right and (ignoring) background noises."
Lieberman also said that Azaria deserved support whatever the conclusions of the legal proceeedings "We will stand by the soldier even if he made a mistake. We are committed to giving him all of the help (we can). It cannot be that soldiers in uniform become objects of politicians' attacks. People in uniform are the emissaries of the people of Israel."
The defense minister also called on Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to adopt the fundamental principle, for any future agreement with the Palestinians, of land swaps. “Why does the ‘Triangle’ (a group of Arab downs adjacent to the Green Line) and Umm al-Fahm need to be part of Israel?,” he asked the audience.
“Why do I need to subsidize Raed Salah and pay the salary of Hanin Zoabi? I do not understand why the prime minister will not adopt the core principle. The time has come for him and Likud to adopt the principle of land exchanges.”
This was Lieberman's first such Q&A since becoming defense minister in May.
11 sept 2016
Sgt. Elor Azaria's Staff Sergeant testified Sunday in the special military court in Jaffa, insisting that the defendant 'never behaved like a thug,' before slamming his commanders for 'trying to cover their own backsides.'
Staff Sgt. ‘T’ (res.) provided testimony Sunday morning in the ongoing trial of Sgt. Elor Azaria—who was indicted for manslaughter after he was captured on camera shooting the already neutralized Palestinian terrorist, Abed al Fatah al-Sharif, to death in Hebron.
Speaking at the special military court in Jaffa, T. he said that Azaria was “professional” and “caring. He never thinks of harming anything. He never expressed himself in an attacking manner against Palestinians.”
T. added that “He never used his power as a weapon and that is why I have testified before the Criminal Investigations Division (CID) that Azaria did not behave like thug. I would not have left the area if I had known the terrorist was moving. I told the CID that I don’t believe Azaria shot out of malice. “
“The commanders presented Azaria in a negative light in conversations after the incident. We spoke with soldiers asking them not to rebel over the treatment towards Elor,” he continued, adding that the conversations conducted by the company commanders with the soldiers influenced them. “It undermines you, influences you and affects your understanding. I felt as though the soldiers were trying to cover their backsides and saving themselves because they never prepared us enough.
The company commander, just like the platoon commander, showed the same signs of disrespect, kind of boycotting Azaria. When I was investigated the CID I was under a lot of pressure from the company to get in line with the spirit of the commander.”
Turning to the overall atmosphere at the scene, T. described one of uncertainty and disorder. “We were never drilled on how to close off the scene of an attack. They never ever went over instructions that the company commander spoke about. The commanders didn’t really take command or say what to do,” he insisted. “Nothing was clear at the scene before Elor’s gun shots. It seems that even the commanders at the scene were confused and no one got the disorder under control.
The soldier who was wounded in the attack told me when I got to the scene: ‘They stabbed me but I killed both terrorists.’ I didn’t sense any threat at the scene because I thought both terrorists had died (before Elor’s gun shots), but I did worry about a continued attack and I thought that this attack was a diversion for another attack. We didn’t know what was coming next. There was chaos and a lot of noise. There was a feeling of chaos at the scene.”
Staff Sgt. ‘T’ (res.) provided testimony Sunday morning in the ongoing trial of Sgt. Elor Azaria—who was indicted for manslaughter after he was captured on camera shooting the already neutralized Palestinian terrorist, Abed al Fatah al-Sharif, to death in Hebron.
Speaking at the special military court in Jaffa, T. he said that Azaria was “professional” and “caring. He never thinks of harming anything. He never expressed himself in an attacking manner against Palestinians.”
T. added that “He never used his power as a weapon and that is why I have testified before the Criminal Investigations Division (CID) that Azaria did not behave like thug. I would not have left the area if I had known the terrorist was moving. I told the CID that I don’t believe Azaria shot out of malice. “
“The commanders presented Azaria in a negative light in conversations after the incident. We spoke with soldiers asking them not to rebel over the treatment towards Elor,” he continued, adding that the conversations conducted by the company commanders with the soldiers influenced them. “It undermines you, influences you and affects your understanding. I felt as though the soldiers were trying to cover their backsides and saving themselves because they never prepared us enough.
The company commander, just like the platoon commander, showed the same signs of disrespect, kind of boycotting Azaria. When I was investigated the CID I was under a lot of pressure from the company to get in line with the spirit of the commander.”
Turning to the overall atmosphere at the scene, T. described one of uncertainty and disorder. “We were never drilled on how to close off the scene of an attack. They never ever went over instructions that the company commander spoke about. The commanders didn’t really take command or say what to do,” he insisted. “Nothing was clear at the scene before Elor’s gun shots. It seems that even the commanders at the scene were confused and no one got the disorder under control.
The soldier who was wounded in the attack told me when I got to the scene: ‘They stabbed me but I killed both terrorists.’ I didn’t sense any threat at the scene because I thought both terrorists had died (before Elor’s gun shots), but I did worry about a continued attack and I thought that this attack was a diversion for another attack. We didn’t know what was coming next. There was chaos and a lot of noise. There was a feeling of chaos at the scene.”
9 sept 2016
A survey conducted Thursday by the Israel Democracy Institute and Tel Aviv University showed that 65% of the Israelis support the killing of an injured Palestinian at the scene in al-Khalil, Maariv Hebrew newspaper said.
Most Israelis polled expressed support for IOF Sgt. Elor Azariya, who is currently on trial for “manslaughter” as a result of his actions.
Azariya shot a wounded Palestinian for allegedly carrying out a stabbing attack. According to the survey, half of the respondents believe that every Palestinian who “attacks” Israelis should be killed, even if neutralized.
65% of respondents back Azariya’s story which says that he fired in self-defense, while 25% do not believe him, stating the firing of his weapon was unnecessary.
Last March, the Israeli human rights organisation B'Tselem released a video showing an Israeli soldier shooting and killing an injured Palestinian as he lay in the road after an alleged stabbing attempt in the West Bank city of al-Khalil.
The video shows the injured Palestinian, named as Abed al-Fatah a-Sharif, lying on the ground for nearly two minutes as medics attend to the injured soldier. Then an Israeli soldier, surrounded by dozens of others, lifts his gun and shoots the 21-year-old Sharif in the head.
“The incident happens in the plain view of many other soldiers and officers, who do not not seem to take any notice,” B’Tselem said in a statement.
In October, at the start of the ongoing Jerusalem Intifada, Amnesty International called on Israel to end its “pattern of unlawful killings”. The group accused Israeli forces of committing “extrajudicial killings” against Palestinians.
Most Israelis polled expressed support for IOF Sgt. Elor Azariya, who is currently on trial for “manslaughter” as a result of his actions.
Azariya shot a wounded Palestinian for allegedly carrying out a stabbing attack. According to the survey, half of the respondents believe that every Palestinian who “attacks” Israelis should be killed, even if neutralized.
65% of respondents back Azariya’s story which says that he fired in self-defense, while 25% do not believe him, stating the firing of his weapon was unnecessary.
Last March, the Israeli human rights organisation B'Tselem released a video showing an Israeli soldier shooting and killing an injured Palestinian as he lay in the road after an alleged stabbing attempt in the West Bank city of al-Khalil.
The video shows the injured Palestinian, named as Abed al-Fatah a-Sharif, lying on the ground for nearly two minutes as medics attend to the injured soldier. Then an Israeli soldier, surrounded by dozens of others, lifts his gun and shoots the 21-year-old Sharif in the head.
“The incident happens in the plain view of many other soldiers and officers, who do not not seem to take any notice,” B’Tselem said in a statement.
In October, at the start of the ongoing Jerusalem Intifada, Amnesty International called on Israel to end its “pattern of unlawful killings”. The group accused Israeli forces of committing “extrajudicial killings” against Palestinians.
