9 may 1994
The euphoria that surrounded the White House signing of the Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles was nowhere in evidence last week in Cairo at the signing of the Gaza-Jericho interim agreement.
There was a heavy dose of realism in the air, a clear and unequivocal sense that the Israelis had squeezed too hard, that the Palestinians had been forced to give up too much, and that the agreement, while still workable, left the Palestinians in an extremely weak position.
Critics are noting that `Arafat did not achieve what Mandela won in South Africa. Such comparisons are a historic to the point of being absurd. The campaign to make South Africa a unified democratic state had strong U.S., European and Soviet support for decades. An effective international sanctions regime, operating with the full support of the United States, was one of Mandela’s most effective weapons.
Over the past 20 years Arafat has had, at best, the passive support of Europe. Most of that time, he found the full power and authority of the United States, the world’s greatest power, aligned against his movement and its aspirations. To a great extent, the problems that complicate the implementation of the Israel-PLO peace agreement stem from malformations in Israeli and Arab politics during the past 25 years of struggle.
The Israel-PLO conflict became part of the larger East-West struggle. The Israelis, especially during the Reagan years, received a green light to pursue the goals of expansion into the West Bank and Gaza, annexation of East Jerusalem and the eradication of the Palestinian national movement.
This systematic and sustained campaign weakened the leadership of the Palestinian national movement and created conditions ripe for the emergence of regional extremist and rejectionist movements that now threaten the chances of peace. Likewise, the Israeli government is confronted by extremist forces (including the former Likud government) that have enjoyed significant U.S. support and now operate as a law unto itself in Israeli society and in the occupied territories.
It is within this historical context that one can justify the current agreement.
I could agree in the abstract with the position espoused by, for example, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine that the best solution is a comprehensive peace based upon Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 (and other relevant resolutions) which call for full and unconditional Israeli withdrawal and the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza with its capital in East Jerusalem – but would Israel ever agree to that formula, and which U.S. Administration or European government would force such a solution?
Dreams can be entertaining and even sustaining, but politics is the art of what is possible, not what is, in the best case, desirable. Substituting our dreams for reality is a recipe for unmitigated disaster.
The critics aside, reality – as somber as it is – dictates that we understand the circumstances on the ground before defining our goals and outlining a realistic plan to achieve them.
In this sense, the fears of the Israeli right wing are the hope of the Palestinian people. The Gaza-Jericho accord can be (and I believe that it is) the first step toward an independent Palestinian state. The path is neither neat nor quick – the details left unresolved in the accord ensure as much – but avenue for achieving more is there, as the Likud and their allies can plainly see.
There is the possibility that Palestinian critics of the accord could also be right and that the accord merely lays the groundwork for a continuing and grim occupation. What the critics fail to see, unfortunately, is that they and other Palestinians will be the force that decides when and how the process ends. The Palestinian people and their leadership have the opportunity, if they grasp it, to control their own fate.
The delay in implementation, the apparent fuzziness of the accord and the absence of euphoria in Palestinian society are not necessarily bad. Too much euphoria would lead to expectations that would place an undue burden on the Palestinian authority. One of the greatest dangers facing any transition government is the failure to meet unrealistically high expectations (witness, for example, the difficulties in Russia and Poland). Low expectations, on the other hand, actually give the Palestinian authority some needed breathing space.
But sooner or later, real change must occur. The national authority must be in a position to deliver services and create economic growth if it is to win support and expand its popular mandate. An effort must be made to mobilize Palestinian talent and resources toward the task of nation-building.
Chairman Arafat has often proudly referred to Palestinians as the state-builders of the Middle East. He notes the role that Palestinian entrepreneurs, administrators and civil servants have played in building several Arab nations. The question remains whether these talented and creative Palestinians have been adequately consulted or utilized in drawing up plans for administering the Gaza-Jericho areas. Something akin to a Palestinian peace corps should be created to recruit Diaspora Palestinians and bring them to work in Gaza and the West Bank, even if only for a year at a time. In this way, they can share their experience and their insights in the nation-building experiment.
Palestinian and Arab capital also must find its way to the territories. This will not happen unless a climate suitable for such investment is created.
To create a free-market economy that will spur rapid economic growth will require an economic plan that fosters private sector development. Tax-free enterprise zones must be created, and other incentives provided to lure investors to the newly autonomous areas. Ultimately, the big dream of an independent and thriving Palestinian economy will be achieved only if the small dreams of private investors and entrepreneurs also have the chance to come true. An economic commission should be instituted to promote investment and to help foster and expand industrial and commercial activity in the territories.
A great deal more could also be said about what needs to be done toward institutionalizing Palestinian democracy (which must extend beyond tolerance of free speech) and using non-violent direct action to expand Palestinian rights and ultimately win a total end of the occupation. However, one step that would significantly advance the Palestinian cause is upgrading the Palestinian mission to Washington. The Palestinians have lacked a serious voice in Washington for too long. It is now more critical than ever to find a seasoned and respected diplomat who is capable of shaping the policy debate in Washington and also winning support in key sectors of American society for Palestinian aspirations.
Now is the time to take seriously the need to provide both leadership and a strategy aimed at winning U.S. support for Palestinians rights.
***
A note:
I was in Cairo as part of a U.S. Presidential delegation invited by the White House to represent our government at the recent signing ceremony.
I and Mel Levine, a former Congressman from California, as co-Presidents of Builders for Peace, were asked by the Administration to assemble Board members of Builders for Peace to largely comprise this U.S. Presidential delegation.
The group was divided evenly among Arab Americans and American Jews, and included some of this country’s most prominent leaders in both communities.
We flew on Air Force 2, and during our 17 hours on the ground in Cairo we met with U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher and Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin of Israel, the Israeli Minister of Security Amnon Shahak, PLO Chairman Yasir `Arafat and chief PLO negotiator Nabeel Shaath.
As a group the U.S. delegation was impressed with the historical significance of the event and the urgency to commit energy and resources to make the accord work. Especially those who were leaders in the U.S. business community – both Palestinian Americans and Jewish Americans – saw the need and opportunity to help grow the Palestinian economy. They are ready and able to participate in investment opportunities in the West Bank and Gaza. They asked hard questions of Chairman `Arafat during the long session with him, and received positive responses to their concerns. Now is the time, all agree, to get to work to expand the accords and to build a real peace.
Some will continue to mouth slogans of the past, but the wall has fallen and there is no going back. Now is not the time for old slogans and old dreams: it is the time to build institutions and create real facts on the ground in Palestine. Or, to paraphrase Marx, as I have before, this is not the time to criticize reality, but to develop and use the power to change it.
There was a heavy dose of realism in the air, a clear and unequivocal sense that the Israelis had squeezed too hard, that the Palestinians had been forced to give up too much, and that the agreement, while still workable, left the Palestinians in an extremely weak position.
Critics are noting that `Arafat did not achieve what Mandela won in South Africa. Such comparisons are a historic to the point of being absurd. The campaign to make South Africa a unified democratic state had strong U.S., European and Soviet support for decades. An effective international sanctions regime, operating with the full support of the United States, was one of Mandela’s most effective weapons.
Over the past 20 years Arafat has had, at best, the passive support of Europe. Most of that time, he found the full power and authority of the United States, the world’s greatest power, aligned against his movement and its aspirations. To a great extent, the problems that complicate the implementation of the Israel-PLO peace agreement stem from malformations in Israeli and Arab politics during the past 25 years of struggle.
The Israel-PLO conflict became part of the larger East-West struggle. The Israelis, especially during the Reagan years, received a green light to pursue the goals of expansion into the West Bank and Gaza, annexation of East Jerusalem and the eradication of the Palestinian national movement.
This systematic and sustained campaign weakened the leadership of the Palestinian national movement and created conditions ripe for the emergence of regional extremist and rejectionist movements that now threaten the chances of peace. Likewise, the Israeli government is confronted by extremist forces (including the former Likud government) that have enjoyed significant U.S. support and now operate as a law unto itself in Israeli society and in the occupied territories.
It is within this historical context that one can justify the current agreement.
I could agree in the abstract with the position espoused by, for example, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine that the best solution is a comprehensive peace based upon Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 (and other relevant resolutions) which call for full and unconditional Israeli withdrawal and the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza with its capital in East Jerusalem – but would Israel ever agree to that formula, and which U.S. Administration or European government would force such a solution?
Dreams can be entertaining and even sustaining, but politics is the art of what is possible, not what is, in the best case, desirable. Substituting our dreams for reality is a recipe for unmitigated disaster.
The critics aside, reality – as somber as it is – dictates that we understand the circumstances on the ground before defining our goals and outlining a realistic plan to achieve them.
In this sense, the fears of the Israeli right wing are the hope of the Palestinian people. The Gaza-Jericho accord can be (and I believe that it is) the first step toward an independent Palestinian state. The path is neither neat nor quick – the details left unresolved in the accord ensure as much – but avenue for achieving more is there, as the Likud and their allies can plainly see.
There is the possibility that Palestinian critics of the accord could also be right and that the accord merely lays the groundwork for a continuing and grim occupation. What the critics fail to see, unfortunately, is that they and other Palestinians will be the force that decides when and how the process ends. The Palestinian people and their leadership have the opportunity, if they grasp it, to control their own fate.
The delay in implementation, the apparent fuzziness of the accord and the absence of euphoria in Palestinian society are not necessarily bad. Too much euphoria would lead to expectations that would place an undue burden on the Palestinian authority. One of the greatest dangers facing any transition government is the failure to meet unrealistically high expectations (witness, for example, the difficulties in Russia and Poland). Low expectations, on the other hand, actually give the Palestinian authority some needed breathing space.
But sooner or later, real change must occur. The national authority must be in a position to deliver services and create economic growth if it is to win support and expand its popular mandate. An effort must be made to mobilize Palestinian talent and resources toward the task of nation-building.
Chairman Arafat has often proudly referred to Palestinians as the state-builders of the Middle East. He notes the role that Palestinian entrepreneurs, administrators and civil servants have played in building several Arab nations. The question remains whether these talented and creative Palestinians have been adequately consulted or utilized in drawing up plans for administering the Gaza-Jericho areas. Something akin to a Palestinian peace corps should be created to recruit Diaspora Palestinians and bring them to work in Gaza and the West Bank, even if only for a year at a time. In this way, they can share their experience and their insights in the nation-building experiment.
Palestinian and Arab capital also must find its way to the territories. This will not happen unless a climate suitable for such investment is created.
To create a free-market economy that will spur rapid economic growth will require an economic plan that fosters private sector development. Tax-free enterprise zones must be created, and other incentives provided to lure investors to the newly autonomous areas. Ultimately, the big dream of an independent and thriving Palestinian economy will be achieved only if the small dreams of private investors and entrepreneurs also have the chance to come true. An economic commission should be instituted to promote investment and to help foster and expand industrial and commercial activity in the territories.
A great deal more could also be said about what needs to be done toward institutionalizing Palestinian democracy (which must extend beyond tolerance of free speech) and using non-violent direct action to expand Palestinian rights and ultimately win a total end of the occupation. However, one step that would significantly advance the Palestinian cause is upgrading the Palestinian mission to Washington. The Palestinians have lacked a serious voice in Washington for too long. It is now more critical than ever to find a seasoned and respected diplomat who is capable of shaping the policy debate in Washington and also winning support in key sectors of American society for Palestinian aspirations.
Now is the time to take seriously the need to provide both leadership and a strategy aimed at winning U.S. support for Palestinians rights.
***
A note:
I was in Cairo as part of a U.S. Presidential delegation invited by the White House to represent our government at the recent signing ceremony.
I and Mel Levine, a former Congressman from California, as co-Presidents of Builders for Peace, were asked by the Administration to assemble Board members of Builders for Peace to largely comprise this U.S. Presidential delegation.
The group was divided evenly among Arab Americans and American Jews, and included some of this country’s most prominent leaders in both communities.
We flew on Air Force 2, and during our 17 hours on the ground in Cairo we met with U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher and Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin of Israel, the Israeli Minister of Security Amnon Shahak, PLO Chairman Yasir `Arafat and chief PLO negotiator Nabeel Shaath.
As a group the U.S. delegation was impressed with the historical significance of the event and the urgency to commit energy and resources to make the accord work. Especially those who were leaders in the U.S. business community – both Palestinian Americans and Jewish Americans – saw the need and opportunity to help grow the Palestinian economy. They are ready and able to participate in investment opportunities in the West Bank and Gaza. They asked hard questions of Chairman `Arafat during the long session with him, and received positive responses to their concerns. Now is the time, all agree, to get to work to expand the accords and to build a real peace.
Some will continue to mouth slogans of the past, but the wall has fallen and there is no going back. Now is not the time for old slogans and old dreams: it is the time to build institutions and create real facts on the ground in Palestine. Or, to paraphrase Marx, as I have before, this is not the time to criticize reality, but to develop and use the power to change it.
18 apr 1994
Last week Jesse Jackson and I went to Jerusalem to address an international conference sponsored by Hebron University. Jackson was to be the banquet speaker and I was to deliver the luncheon address at the event commemorating the 30th anniversary of the PLO.
Entitled “Promoting Peace through Understanding,” the conference sought to bring together 200 Palestinian leaders from throughout the West Bank and Gaza to both evaluate the history of their struggle as well as to plan for their future in light of the September 13th signing of the Declaration of Principles.
As a result of actions by the Israeli authorities, however, we were not able to proceed as planned. Instead of focusing on the future, we were forced to deal directly with the brutal present of an apparently unyielding occupation. But even in this there were important lessons to be learned that can provide direction to the continuing movement toward a just and lasting peace.
The goal of the conference was clear: an academic conference sponsored by a university and supported by the PLO to establish a Palestinian dialogue for peace. Of course, we assumed the Israelis would not only allow, but might even encourage and protect such an event. But when the Israeli right wing attacked the event and accused Rabin of surrendering Jerusalem to the PLO (because the conference was to take place in Jerusalem), the Israeli government responded by ordering the conference to be closed only one day prior to its announced opening.
Permits for travel were denied to Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza who planned to attend the conference, making it impossible for them to come to Jerusalem. The management of the hotel that was to be the site of the conference was forced to sign an agreement forbidding the event to take place on their premises under threat of personal arrest and closure of the establishment.
Citing the authority of the British Emergency Regulation of 1945, the Military Governor ordered the Hotel “to shut down each and every hall or conference room that serves or could serve for the purpose of the meeting as well as any building or courtyard in the area of the Hotel where such a gathering could be held.” And on the morning of the opening of the conference, Israeli military personnel set up roadblocks on the roads around the hotel, closing it off to all traffic.
Although we failed to convince the Israeli courts to overturn the order, we resolved to proceed with the conference despite the threats. We further decided that we would peacefully challenge their attempt to prevent the conference from convening.
At 9:00 a.m. – the time the conference was supposed to begin – we assembled on the steps of the Ambassador Hotel, which was the site where the PLO had been announced 30 years ago. We were forbidden from using any part of the inside of the hotel or its courtyard, so we met in the only possible place: on the front steps. There, on the steps, we convened the conference.
Then, led by Jesse Jackson, we marched arm in arm for 5 blocks, through Israeli military roadblocks, to convene the conference at Orient House, which serves as the unofficial Palestinian Guest House in Jerusalem.
Because we asserted our right to convene, because we peacefully marched, and because we had strong international support (including Jesse Jackson, from the U.S., and Ambassador Eric Rouleau of France, representatives of the United Nations and officials of other foreign consulates in East Jerusalem), we succeeded. We marched non-violently through the streets of Jerusalem, and the Israeli soldiers who were watching us were bewildered, and unable to stop us (even though the Military Governor had declared that any gathering of five or more people was to be broken up).
Later that night in discussions with Israeli Foreign Minister, Shimon Peres, Jackson succeeded in negotiating an agreement which would allow the conference banquet to take place back at the Ambassador Hotel.
Peres simply wanted assurances that the speakers at the banquet would be in support of the peace process and would not be confrontational. While it was difficult to agree to any restrictions on free speech, it seemed important to grasp the victory that would allow the conference organizers to return to the original venue of the conference, at least for its closing banquet.
The Israelis remained obstinate in refusing any permits to allow Palestinians from outside Jerusalem to attend to the banquet. Undeterred, the conference organizers worked through the day, mobilizing those who could come to actually go to the hotel. By that evening a sizable number of Palestinian leaders from the city were at the Hotel for the function.
Yet one hour before the banquet was to begin, the Israeli military once again set up their roadblocks around the hotel, and several Shin Bet officers came into the hotel with new orders. They told me that the new orders forbade anyone but Jesse Jackson from speaking at the banquet. Further, the officers stated that they were to be present inside the banquet hall to insure that their orders were followed.
I argued that this order violated our agreement with the Foreign Minister. The officers replied that their new order came from Prime Minister Rabin’s office, and that they were only following orders. I reminded them that that argument had been used by others in the past with tragic consequences. Their presence at the banquet, I told them, would not secure peace, it would only produce anger.
I urged them to leave and not return. They did leave, and after we had further communications with the Foreign Ministry, the Shin Bet agents did not return.
At the banquet Jesse Jackson delivered a powerful speech. His experiences during the days leading up to the conference led him to conclude that, despite the fact that “We are here at an historic moment with peace accords opening new possibilities…the occupation continues and the daily indignities, the fear and the pain continue.”
There were, he noted, “several dimensions of this occupation that are rare in the world today. The police surrounding the hotel, arresting guests, the press having to clear stories through the military censor.” All of these Jackson decried as “provocative acts of humiliation.”
Reverend Jackson went further, noting that he was keenly aware that more than 10,000 Palestinians were still in jail, land was still being expropriated, more Palestinians were killed after the massacre than during the massacre, and the closure of Jerusalem was causing severe unemployment and a health care crisis.
He understood Palestinian pain because, as he put it “I grew up on the West Bank of America,” where he, too lived with oppression and the denial of basic rights and human dignity.
But despite the fact that some behaved as if no changes had occurred, and others remained cynical about whether any real changes could occur, Jackson countered with his strong belief that real change was in fact occurring. He said,
“Thirty years ago, it was said that you were not a people, that you deserved no land, no power to share, no security, no self-determination, no homeland. After thirty years, fundamental shifts have occurred, codified in the Declaration of Principles. A shift from a no-talk policy to a let-us-talk policy. From disregard to mutual recognition. ...The peace and freedom tree has been planted. It must be allowed to sprout and grow. A new vision must emerge…as you shift from the defense of survival of war to the offense of development of hope. For most who have been immersed in the struggle for all of our lives, this is a sea change in preparation—from war preparation to peace preparation. We must learn a new, different, and necessary lesson—to build and expand on the space that exists, to learn to move from mutual recognition to self-determination in actuality, on the ground.
“Peace is not a gift. It is a struggle. In many ways it is a more difficult struggle than war. It must be built day by day and brick by brick. If it is not nurtured, its possibilities can only be a vision which will wither and die.
”...Surely for all of the possibility, it is the reality that Israeli troops are leaving Gaza and Jericho as we speak, the reality that Palestinian leaders are returning, that prisoners—some but far too few—are being released, that authority is being transferred on the ground. Those are the first fragile buds, the first taste of the fruits of peace. But the taste must become a meal soon, or peace can be starved from lack of sustenance.
“The groundwork has been laid, the agreement has been signed. Let us now lay the cornerstone and begin to build the new building.
”...With the new possibility, it is vital to undertake new responsibilities – building real institutions on the ground, grasping the opportunity offered by formal recognition to gain new allies abroad and new assistance for development….
“In this process, a new strategy must be considered for the new possibility. Mass, aggressive, disciplined non-violent action, to complete the unfinished task. ...this discipline of creative non-violence has power. ...It touches the conscience of the people and the soul of the nation. It changes the rules of warfare…. The cynics and saboteurs of peace must not be allowed to alter the momentum nor divert the course.”
***
Following Jackson’s stirring address, the conference organizers from Hebron University and others spoke. I reminded the audience that we had succeeded in convening the conference despite the military and the Shin Bet. We had marched through military roadblocks and defied the authority that sough to silence us. In reality, our recent behavior had shown that non-violence could effectively challenge violence and oppression. And despite, or maybe because of, Israeli efforts to block our conference, it succeeded in getting world-wide press attention —probably more coverage than it would have received had the Israeli military left the event alone.
In many ways, we have all learned that September 13th was not an end point but a beginning. So, too, when an agreement is finally signed to implement the Declaration of Principles it will be merely another beginning in the continuing struggle for full Palestinian rights.
At every stage in the process there will be critics and saboteurs who will object and criticize—and who will lack the vision to build, to challenge and to make changes. What is required is a new strategy, one that energizes the Palestinian population and world-wide support to expand the peace process and to expand Palestinian rights.
In confronting a military force, the most effective weapon is the moral force of disciplined, non-violent political organizing. It can be used to effectively challenge the occupation and closure of East Jerusalem, the settlements, and to secure Palestinian rights in all their forms.
In a real sense, then, our conference was a success. We accomplished most of what we set out to accomplish. The world saw clearly that the occupation and closure of East Jerusalem continues, and we collectively learned what we set out to learn: how to adapt to the new period, and to build peace, real peace, through organizing and understanding.
Entitled “Promoting Peace through Understanding,” the conference sought to bring together 200 Palestinian leaders from throughout the West Bank and Gaza to both evaluate the history of their struggle as well as to plan for their future in light of the September 13th signing of the Declaration of Principles.
As a result of actions by the Israeli authorities, however, we were not able to proceed as planned. Instead of focusing on the future, we were forced to deal directly with the brutal present of an apparently unyielding occupation. But even in this there were important lessons to be learned that can provide direction to the continuing movement toward a just and lasting peace.
The goal of the conference was clear: an academic conference sponsored by a university and supported by the PLO to establish a Palestinian dialogue for peace. Of course, we assumed the Israelis would not only allow, but might even encourage and protect such an event. But when the Israeli right wing attacked the event and accused Rabin of surrendering Jerusalem to the PLO (because the conference was to take place in Jerusalem), the Israeli government responded by ordering the conference to be closed only one day prior to its announced opening.
Permits for travel were denied to Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza who planned to attend the conference, making it impossible for them to come to Jerusalem. The management of the hotel that was to be the site of the conference was forced to sign an agreement forbidding the event to take place on their premises under threat of personal arrest and closure of the establishment.
Citing the authority of the British Emergency Regulation of 1945, the Military Governor ordered the Hotel “to shut down each and every hall or conference room that serves or could serve for the purpose of the meeting as well as any building or courtyard in the area of the Hotel where such a gathering could be held.” And on the morning of the opening of the conference, Israeli military personnel set up roadblocks on the roads around the hotel, closing it off to all traffic.
Although we failed to convince the Israeli courts to overturn the order, we resolved to proceed with the conference despite the threats. We further decided that we would peacefully challenge their attempt to prevent the conference from convening.
At 9:00 a.m. – the time the conference was supposed to begin – we assembled on the steps of the Ambassador Hotel, which was the site where the PLO had been announced 30 years ago. We were forbidden from using any part of the inside of the hotel or its courtyard, so we met in the only possible place: on the front steps. There, on the steps, we convened the conference.
Then, led by Jesse Jackson, we marched arm in arm for 5 blocks, through Israeli military roadblocks, to convene the conference at Orient House, which serves as the unofficial Palestinian Guest House in Jerusalem.
Because we asserted our right to convene, because we peacefully marched, and because we had strong international support (including Jesse Jackson, from the U.S., and Ambassador Eric Rouleau of France, representatives of the United Nations and officials of other foreign consulates in East Jerusalem), we succeeded. We marched non-violently through the streets of Jerusalem, and the Israeli soldiers who were watching us were bewildered, and unable to stop us (even though the Military Governor had declared that any gathering of five or more people was to be broken up).
Later that night in discussions with Israeli Foreign Minister, Shimon Peres, Jackson succeeded in negotiating an agreement which would allow the conference banquet to take place back at the Ambassador Hotel.
Peres simply wanted assurances that the speakers at the banquet would be in support of the peace process and would not be confrontational. While it was difficult to agree to any restrictions on free speech, it seemed important to grasp the victory that would allow the conference organizers to return to the original venue of the conference, at least for its closing banquet.
The Israelis remained obstinate in refusing any permits to allow Palestinians from outside Jerusalem to attend to the banquet. Undeterred, the conference organizers worked through the day, mobilizing those who could come to actually go to the hotel. By that evening a sizable number of Palestinian leaders from the city were at the Hotel for the function.
Yet one hour before the banquet was to begin, the Israeli military once again set up their roadblocks around the hotel, and several Shin Bet officers came into the hotel with new orders. They told me that the new orders forbade anyone but Jesse Jackson from speaking at the banquet. Further, the officers stated that they were to be present inside the banquet hall to insure that their orders were followed.
I argued that this order violated our agreement with the Foreign Minister. The officers replied that their new order came from Prime Minister Rabin’s office, and that they were only following orders. I reminded them that that argument had been used by others in the past with tragic consequences. Their presence at the banquet, I told them, would not secure peace, it would only produce anger.
I urged them to leave and not return. They did leave, and after we had further communications with the Foreign Ministry, the Shin Bet agents did not return.
At the banquet Jesse Jackson delivered a powerful speech. His experiences during the days leading up to the conference led him to conclude that, despite the fact that “We are here at an historic moment with peace accords opening new possibilities…the occupation continues and the daily indignities, the fear and the pain continue.”
There were, he noted, “several dimensions of this occupation that are rare in the world today. The police surrounding the hotel, arresting guests, the press having to clear stories through the military censor.” All of these Jackson decried as “provocative acts of humiliation.”
Reverend Jackson went further, noting that he was keenly aware that more than 10,000 Palestinians were still in jail, land was still being expropriated, more Palestinians were killed after the massacre than during the massacre, and the closure of Jerusalem was causing severe unemployment and a health care crisis.
He understood Palestinian pain because, as he put it “I grew up on the West Bank of America,” where he, too lived with oppression and the denial of basic rights and human dignity.
But despite the fact that some behaved as if no changes had occurred, and others remained cynical about whether any real changes could occur, Jackson countered with his strong belief that real change was in fact occurring. He said,
“Thirty years ago, it was said that you were not a people, that you deserved no land, no power to share, no security, no self-determination, no homeland. After thirty years, fundamental shifts have occurred, codified in the Declaration of Principles. A shift from a no-talk policy to a let-us-talk policy. From disregard to mutual recognition. ...The peace and freedom tree has been planted. It must be allowed to sprout and grow. A new vision must emerge…as you shift from the defense of survival of war to the offense of development of hope. For most who have been immersed in the struggle for all of our lives, this is a sea change in preparation—from war preparation to peace preparation. We must learn a new, different, and necessary lesson—to build and expand on the space that exists, to learn to move from mutual recognition to self-determination in actuality, on the ground.
“Peace is not a gift. It is a struggle. In many ways it is a more difficult struggle than war. It must be built day by day and brick by brick. If it is not nurtured, its possibilities can only be a vision which will wither and die.
”...Surely for all of the possibility, it is the reality that Israeli troops are leaving Gaza and Jericho as we speak, the reality that Palestinian leaders are returning, that prisoners—some but far too few—are being released, that authority is being transferred on the ground. Those are the first fragile buds, the first taste of the fruits of peace. But the taste must become a meal soon, or peace can be starved from lack of sustenance.
“The groundwork has been laid, the agreement has been signed. Let us now lay the cornerstone and begin to build the new building.
”...With the new possibility, it is vital to undertake new responsibilities – building real institutions on the ground, grasping the opportunity offered by formal recognition to gain new allies abroad and new assistance for development….
“In this process, a new strategy must be considered for the new possibility. Mass, aggressive, disciplined non-violent action, to complete the unfinished task. ...this discipline of creative non-violence has power. ...It touches the conscience of the people and the soul of the nation. It changes the rules of warfare…. The cynics and saboteurs of peace must not be allowed to alter the momentum nor divert the course.”
***
Following Jackson’s stirring address, the conference organizers from Hebron University and others spoke. I reminded the audience that we had succeeded in convening the conference despite the military and the Shin Bet. We had marched through military roadblocks and defied the authority that sough to silence us. In reality, our recent behavior had shown that non-violence could effectively challenge violence and oppression. And despite, or maybe because of, Israeli efforts to block our conference, it succeeded in getting world-wide press attention —probably more coverage than it would have received had the Israeli military left the event alone.
In many ways, we have all learned that September 13th was not an end point but a beginning. So, too, when an agreement is finally signed to implement the Declaration of Principles it will be merely another beginning in the continuing struggle for full Palestinian rights.
At every stage in the process there will be critics and saboteurs who will object and criticize—and who will lack the vision to build, to challenge and to make changes. What is required is a new strategy, one that energizes the Palestinian population and world-wide support to expand the peace process and to expand Palestinian rights.
In confronting a military force, the most effective weapon is the moral force of disciplined, non-violent political organizing. It can be used to effectively challenge the occupation and closure of East Jerusalem, the settlements, and to secure Palestinian rights in all their forms.
In a real sense, then, our conference was a success. We accomplished most of what we set out to accomplish. The world saw clearly that the occupation and closure of East Jerusalem continues, and we collectively learned what we set out to learn: how to adapt to the new period, and to build peace, real peace, through organizing and understanding.
7 mar 1994
The outrageous massacre at the Al Ibrahim mosque has done more than cast a pall over the Middle East peace talks. It has had dramatic effects on all the major parties to the negotiations: the Palestinians, the Israelis and the Americans. It has exposed flaws in the process, the underlying vulnerability of the Palestinian and Israeli leaderships, and has deepened division within both societies.
There is no question but that in the end the massacre in Hebron will alter the Middle East peace equation – the question is will it be altered for the good of the process or to its detriment?
And that question can only be answered by the responses that all of the major parties to the talks give to the central issues raised by the massacre: the security concerns of Palestinians and Israel’s settlement policy in the occupied lands.
But it is important to note, at this late date, that even if the right responses are given to these concerns, the raw nerves exposed by the massacre may not be sufficiently healed so that the process can again move forward.
Obviously, the most dramatically affected party are the Palestinians. The massacre and its bloody aftermath in which more than 70 Palestinians have been killed (forty-three in the mosque and the others by Israeli Defense Force (IDF) actions throughout the territories) have highlighted the extreme vulnerability and powerlessness of the people under occupation.
They are defenseless and unable to effect any control over their daily lives. They are subject to
--arbitrary arrest and/or detention;
--collective punishment
--house demolitions,
--roundups and curfews;
--random and provocative settler violence;
--acts of humiliation by the IDF or settlers or both.
For the Palestinian community living under occupation, the Al Ibrahim mosque massacre was, in more than one way, a lethal blow. It not only killed defenseless civilians at prayer, but it reminded Palestinians of the collective pain they have endured for the last 27 years. With the population already chafing at the slow pace of the negotiations and the concessions their leadership had been forced to make, the massacre further eroded Palestinian confidence in the peace process itself.
The powerlessness of the people under IDF occupation and the asymmetry of power between the Israelis and the Palestinian negotiating teams are a mirror image of each other. Thus the vulnerability of the Palestinian leadership was also exposed by the massacre. In response, the PLO announced that it cannot return to the talks until Israel and the world community take certain steps to ensure the security of Palestinians living under occupation and address the issue of Israel’s accelerated settlement drive.
Simply put, the Palestinian leadership feels that it cannot continue to negotiate under the present rules of the game. Their constituency is too aggrieved, too vulnerable and so alienated from the process that further progress or even talks is impossible. Their return to the talks under current conditions would be rejected by the constituency and any deal they might reach would be a dead letter.
While differing conditions have been put forth by different PLO negotiators, the fundamental concerns relate to correcting the vulnerable state of their constituency and the need to restore confidence in the leadership and integrity to the entire process. And though the Israelis may argue with several of the PLO demands, the U.S. appears to be convinced that the PLO’s assessment of the political situation is sufficiently correct to warrant some significant actions, if the talks are to resume.
Israel and its Labor government has also been affected by the massacre, though in a more subtle way. The extreme shame and revulsion the massacre provoked in most Israelis was heartfelt, and it has generated an internal debate over what must be done to gain control over those elements of their society who not only reject the peace process but are also willing (and able) to wreck it with acts of provocation and terrorism.
Outsiders can find some of the statements by Israeli leaders to be disingenuous. They can say `It was not one lone gunman – the IDF has itself committed such atrocities in the past and the racist ideology of the extremist settlers is shared by many figures in the Israeli political mainstream.’ But one must remember that the Israelis have in the past avoided accepting any part of the blame for acts of violence and shifted it off on others; whereas this time they simply accepted that one of their own had committed this horrible act.
Rabin is acting out of a conviction that the process must go forward. He feels restraint from the right wing (which is one-half of the Israeli Knesset and public opinion) and from the mass psychology of anti-Arab fear and “Eretz Israel” sentiment that right-wing and centrist Israeli politicians have created over the past few decades. But he has been seeking a showdown with the extremists whom he feels are a real threat to peace, so he decided to act – but in a limited way – by disarming some settlers and to agree to some international presence (though not a force and only in a very limited area).
The problem for both Rabin and Arafat (and, I would add, for mainstream Jewish American and Arab American leaders) is that while they are invested in each other and in making their shared process work, and while the mainstream of opinion in both communities remains supportive of them, there is a growing base of opinion that not only rejects their views and their leadership but also has become extremely harsh in their rhetoric and actions and is almost beyond their reach or control.
Can they regain lost ground? Can they rejuvenate their leaderships with a dramatic new deal that generates excitement and support and rekindles the spirit of hope of last September 13th? Given the limited maneuverability of both leaderships, the answer to this question lies with the critical role that must be played by the third major party to the talks: the U.S. Administration.
The Clinton Administration has been working full time to find a way to resolve the impasse created by the massacre and reconvene the peace talks in Washington. It is fascinating to watch the change in how this Administration is dealing with both the issues raised by this crisis and how they are dealing with both Arabs and Jews in an effort to find a solution and create a constituency that will support the peace process.
From Secretary of State Christopher’s strong words of praise for Arafat’s leadership and his compassion for Palestinian victims, it is clear that there has been a change here in Washington. There can be no peace without the PLO, that is clear, but added to that is the realization that unless the issues raised by the massacre are adequately addressed, the PLO will not be at the peace talks. So the order of the day is to find a way to take effective steps to create Palestinian confidence in the process and in the ability of their leadership to deliver on their security concerns so that the process can continue. At the same time, the Administration is wary that it not push Rabin so far as to hamstring him domestically.
The search is underway to find the formula and the mechanism that will meet the basic needs of both parties – and this is new. Palestinian security, at least on this level has now, for the first time, entered the political equation in Washington.
One sign of the Administration’s sensitivity to this new concern has been their intense consultation with Arab Americans. In the past week there have been regular Arab American meetings at all levels of the Administration, including meetings with both Secretary Christopher and Vice President Gore. At these meetings, Arab Americans raised these issues:
--· providing international protection for Palestinians in the occupied territories;
--· the need to disarm the settlers in the West Bank and Gaza and regulation of their behavior by the IDF;
--· a full investigation of the connection Jewish extremist groups have with funding and training in the U.S. and a declaration of these groups as domestic terrorist groups;
--· and U.S. pressure on Israel to stop building new settlements and confiscating land in all the occupied territories.
To all of these concerns, the Administration has been sympathetic and responsive. While not agreeing on all the details of the Arab position, the Administration is clearly making an effort to work to address these concerns so as to move the process forward.
The Administration remains convinced that the best solution to the entire crisis is for the PLO and Israel to come to an agreement, which will begin the process of Israeli withdrawal and will establish, in Secretary Christopher’s words, “Palestinian control over their own lives,” and will create new conditions on the ground in the relations between Palestinians and Israelis.
Palestinians agree, of course, with this assessment and would therefore like to return to the talks as soon as conditions are met that would enable them to do so with integrity. With the U.S. realizing their dilemma and pressing for stronger terms that will meet Palestinian needs, it may be possible to see a return to the peace talks in the near future.
The question that remains is, will reconvening the peace talks or even completing an Israel-PLO agreement be enough to remove the poison that has so contaminated relations in the wake of the Hebron massacre? In part, time will tell, but so too will the effectiveness of U.S. diplomacy and the commitment of Israel to make real changes that restore Palestinian confidence in the talks and the integrity of the peace process.
There is no question but that in the end the massacre in Hebron will alter the Middle East peace equation – the question is will it be altered for the good of the process or to its detriment?
And that question can only be answered by the responses that all of the major parties to the talks give to the central issues raised by the massacre: the security concerns of Palestinians and Israel’s settlement policy in the occupied lands.
But it is important to note, at this late date, that even if the right responses are given to these concerns, the raw nerves exposed by the massacre may not be sufficiently healed so that the process can again move forward.
Obviously, the most dramatically affected party are the Palestinians. The massacre and its bloody aftermath in which more than 70 Palestinians have been killed (forty-three in the mosque and the others by Israeli Defense Force (IDF) actions throughout the territories) have highlighted the extreme vulnerability and powerlessness of the people under occupation.
They are defenseless and unable to effect any control over their daily lives. They are subject to
--arbitrary arrest and/or detention;
--collective punishment
--house demolitions,
--roundups and curfews;
--random and provocative settler violence;
--acts of humiliation by the IDF or settlers or both.
For the Palestinian community living under occupation, the Al Ibrahim mosque massacre was, in more than one way, a lethal blow. It not only killed defenseless civilians at prayer, but it reminded Palestinians of the collective pain they have endured for the last 27 years. With the population already chafing at the slow pace of the negotiations and the concessions their leadership had been forced to make, the massacre further eroded Palestinian confidence in the peace process itself.
The powerlessness of the people under IDF occupation and the asymmetry of power between the Israelis and the Palestinian negotiating teams are a mirror image of each other. Thus the vulnerability of the Palestinian leadership was also exposed by the massacre. In response, the PLO announced that it cannot return to the talks until Israel and the world community take certain steps to ensure the security of Palestinians living under occupation and address the issue of Israel’s accelerated settlement drive.
Simply put, the Palestinian leadership feels that it cannot continue to negotiate under the present rules of the game. Their constituency is too aggrieved, too vulnerable and so alienated from the process that further progress or even talks is impossible. Their return to the talks under current conditions would be rejected by the constituency and any deal they might reach would be a dead letter.
While differing conditions have been put forth by different PLO negotiators, the fundamental concerns relate to correcting the vulnerable state of their constituency and the need to restore confidence in the leadership and integrity to the entire process. And though the Israelis may argue with several of the PLO demands, the U.S. appears to be convinced that the PLO’s assessment of the political situation is sufficiently correct to warrant some significant actions, if the talks are to resume.
Israel and its Labor government has also been affected by the massacre, though in a more subtle way. The extreme shame and revulsion the massacre provoked in most Israelis was heartfelt, and it has generated an internal debate over what must be done to gain control over those elements of their society who not only reject the peace process but are also willing (and able) to wreck it with acts of provocation and terrorism.
Outsiders can find some of the statements by Israeli leaders to be disingenuous. They can say `It was not one lone gunman – the IDF has itself committed such atrocities in the past and the racist ideology of the extremist settlers is shared by many figures in the Israeli political mainstream.’ But one must remember that the Israelis have in the past avoided accepting any part of the blame for acts of violence and shifted it off on others; whereas this time they simply accepted that one of their own had committed this horrible act.
Rabin is acting out of a conviction that the process must go forward. He feels restraint from the right wing (which is one-half of the Israeli Knesset and public opinion) and from the mass psychology of anti-Arab fear and “Eretz Israel” sentiment that right-wing and centrist Israeli politicians have created over the past few decades. But he has been seeking a showdown with the extremists whom he feels are a real threat to peace, so he decided to act – but in a limited way – by disarming some settlers and to agree to some international presence (though not a force and only in a very limited area).
The problem for both Rabin and Arafat (and, I would add, for mainstream Jewish American and Arab American leaders) is that while they are invested in each other and in making their shared process work, and while the mainstream of opinion in both communities remains supportive of them, there is a growing base of opinion that not only rejects their views and their leadership but also has become extremely harsh in their rhetoric and actions and is almost beyond their reach or control.
Can they regain lost ground? Can they rejuvenate their leaderships with a dramatic new deal that generates excitement and support and rekindles the spirit of hope of last September 13th? Given the limited maneuverability of both leaderships, the answer to this question lies with the critical role that must be played by the third major party to the talks: the U.S. Administration.
The Clinton Administration has been working full time to find a way to resolve the impasse created by the massacre and reconvene the peace talks in Washington. It is fascinating to watch the change in how this Administration is dealing with both the issues raised by this crisis and how they are dealing with both Arabs and Jews in an effort to find a solution and create a constituency that will support the peace process.
From Secretary of State Christopher’s strong words of praise for Arafat’s leadership and his compassion for Palestinian victims, it is clear that there has been a change here in Washington. There can be no peace without the PLO, that is clear, but added to that is the realization that unless the issues raised by the massacre are adequately addressed, the PLO will not be at the peace talks. So the order of the day is to find a way to take effective steps to create Palestinian confidence in the process and in the ability of their leadership to deliver on their security concerns so that the process can continue. At the same time, the Administration is wary that it not push Rabin so far as to hamstring him domestically.
The search is underway to find the formula and the mechanism that will meet the basic needs of both parties – and this is new. Palestinian security, at least on this level has now, for the first time, entered the political equation in Washington.
One sign of the Administration’s sensitivity to this new concern has been their intense consultation with Arab Americans. In the past week there have been regular Arab American meetings at all levels of the Administration, including meetings with both Secretary Christopher and Vice President Gore. At these meetings, Arab Americans raised these issues:
--· providing international protection for Palestinians in the occupied territories;
--· the need to disarm the settlers in the West Bank and Gaza and regulation of their behavior by the IDF;
--· a full investigation of the connection Jewish extremist groups have with funding and training in the U.S. and a declaration of these groups as domestic terrorist groups;
--· and U.S. pressure on Israel to stop building new settlements and confiscating land in all the occupied territories.
To all of these concerns, the Administration has been sympathetic and responsive. While not agreeing on all the details of the Arab position, the Administration is clearly making an effort to work to address these concerns so as to move the process forward.
The Administration remains convinced that the best solution to the entire crisis is for the PLO and Israel to come to an agreement, which will begin the process of Israeli withdrawal and will establish, in Secretary Christopher’s words, “Palestinian control over their own lives,” and will create new conditions on the ground in the relations between Palestinians and Israelis.
Palestinians agree, of course, with this assessment and would therefore like to return to the talks as soon as conditions are met that would enable them to do so with integrity. With the U.S. realizing their dilemma and pressing for stronger terms that will meet Palestinian needs, it may be possible to see a return to the peace talks in the near future.
The question that remains is, will reconvening the peace talks or even completing an Israel-PLO agreement be enough to remove the poison that has so contaminated relations in the wake of the Hebron massacre? In part, time will tell, but so too will the effectiveness of U.S. diplomacy and the commitment of Israel to make real changes that restore Palestinian confidence in the talks and the integrity of the peace process.
14 feb 1994
Don’t be fooled by the applause that accompanied the `Arafat-Peres signing of a partial agreement in Cairo last week. The Israeli-Palestinian peace process is in trouble and may flounder without U.S. leadership.
The September 13th signing of the Declaration of Principles (DoP) between the PLO and Israel did represent an historic breakthrough. While critics cited ambiguities in the accords, the important fact was that through the DoP the Israelis and Palestinians recognized each other, setting the stage for meaningful negotiations to end their generations-old conflict.
Five months later, this negotiating process has yet to produce any concrete steps toward disengagement and peace. This inability to move forward is a function of problems inherent in the negotiating partners themselves: the weakness of both the Labor government of Israel and the PLO, and the asymmetry in the power relationship between them.
Simply put, Israel holds all the cards: it controls all of the Palestinian territory and all aspects of daily life within it. As a result, the negotiating process has been reduced to Palestinian reactions to Israeli positions, all of which are presented as `firm and non-negotiable.’ The only options available to the Palestinian negotiators are saying “No” and threatening to abort the process, or attempting to whittle away at the “firm” Israeli positions in an attempt to win some face-saving gestures.
Israeli Foreign Minister Peres said as much in a February 11 interview when he observed, “These negotiations are with ourselves. The Palestinians don’t have so much to give us.”
So the fate of the process rests in Israeli goodwill and the willingness of the Labor government to respect Palestinian rights and dignity, and to give the Palestinians enough concessions to maintain the integrity of the negotiations.
This leads to the second difficulty facing the peace process, which is the fragile hold Rabin and `Arafat each believe they have over their respective constituencies. While both leaders are invested in the process and publicly recognize the need to support each other’s position, the PLO – as Peres accurately expressed it – doesn’t have so much to give; and Rabin’s government seems to be afraid of giving more than it has already.
The product of this rather weak recipe has been an unpalatable stew.
In the days following the Cairo signing the Israeli press glowed with approval, noting that Israel got everything it wanted – control of all security arrangements – while making few and primarily symbolic concessions. The Arab and Palestinian press simultaneously chafed at the insult of what were described as the “humiliating agreements.”
Palestinian and Israeli extremists sense this weakness, and have used violence and harsh rhetoric to further constrain their leaders by exacerbating tensions and preying on fears.
If left alone under this scenario, the Israeli and Palestinian negotiators cannot successfully complete an agreement which meets both parties’ minimal needs. Outside assistance, and specifically U.S. leadership, will be required to give each side the strength and support it needs to move forward.
While the U.S. has until now refused to become engaged in the negotiating process and will not place pressures on Israel to make concessions, there are still important actions the U.S. could take to greatly assist the parties and make the process work. Two such steps, outside of the negotiating process, come immediately to mind.
First, all parties have agreed that the question of Jerusalem will be left for final stage negotiations, and under the Madrid rules all parties agreed not to take unilateral steps to alter conditions on the ground during the negotiating process. Nevertheless, Israel fully acknowledges that it is constructing 15,000 new housing units (in addition to the 13,500 units begun by the Likud government which it is also completing) in what it describes as Greater Jerusalem – an expanded area stretching at some points more than 6 miles from the historic city.
This building, coupled with the “security roads” and tunnels that Israel is constructing to connect settlements with each other and Jerusalem, is cutting the West Bank into several separate cantons, and serves as a daily reminder to the Palestinians of their lack of control over their daily lives and sharpens their fear of never gaining any semblance of control over their territory.
A firm and public U.S. position against the construction within the occupied territories would enhance the integrity of the process and give the powerless Palestinians some sense of support in their quest for a just and lasting agreement.
Second, a continuing concern of the Palestinians has been their inability to gain direct access to foreign markets during the 27 years of Israeli occupation. A single U.S. announcement that the terms of the U.S.-Israel Free Trade Agreement would apply to Palestinian products exported from the autonomous regions would go a long way toward assuring Palestinians that they can benefit economically from peace.
There is an irony in the current process: in war the victor-vanquished equation applies, but in peace talks it is necessary that both parties emerge strengthened. As the Cairo accords make quite clear, negotiations within the context of the current Israeli-Palestinian relationship and the lack of outside support have served to enhance Israeli strength while further eroding the Palestinian position. But a weakened Palestinian authority will not and cannot produce peace.
Since both leaderships feel compelled to push the process forward, it may be possible for Israel to press the Palestinians to agree to their terms for autonomy and strip the Palestinians of even the trappings of sovereignty and dignity. But such an accord would be impossible for the PLO to sell to its already restless and angry constituency. In fact, such an agreement could only further weaken the PLO’s position in the territories, and is a recipe for continued conflict.
Israeli Environment Minister Yossi Sarid recognized this point when he suggested that forcing too many concessions from the Palestinians would weaken their ability to rally support for the negotiating process: “I think when we are talking about security matters, we have to twist the arms of our dialogue partners. But when we twist the arms, we have to be careful not to break them.”
While Rabin may feel unable to offer more to the Palestinians, the U.S. can, without directly entering the negotiations, take steps that will open up the current impasse. It is a role we cannot afford not to play – it will help not only the Palestinians but the Israelis and the peace process itself.
The September 13th signing of the Declaration of Principles (DoP) between the PLO and Israel did represent an historic breakthrough. While critics cited ambiguities in the accords, the important fact was that through the DoP the Israelis and Palestinians recognized each other, setting the stage for meaningful negotiations to end their generations-old conflict.
Five months later, this negotiating process has yet to produce any concrete steps toward disengagement and peace. This inability to move forward is a function of problems inherent in the negotiating partners themselves: the weakness of both the Labor government of Israel and the PLO, and the asymmetry in the power relationship between them.
Simply put, Israel holds all the cards: it controls all of the Palestinian territory and all aspects of daily life within it. As a result, the negotiating process has been reduced to Palestinian reactions to Israeli positions, all of which are presented as `firm and non-negotiable.’ The only options available to the Palestinian negotiators are saying “No” and threatening to abort the process, or attempting to whittle away at the “firm” Israeli positions in an attempt to win some face-saving gestures.
Israeli Foreign Minister Peres said as much in a February 11 interview when he observed, “These negotiations are with ourselves. The Palestinians don’t have so much to give us.”
So the fate of the process rests in Israeli goodwill and the willingness of the Labor government to respect Palestinian rights and dignity, and to give the Palestinians enough concessions to maintain the integrity of the negotiations.
This leads to the second difficulty facing the peace process, which is the fragile hold Rabin and `Arafat each believe they have over their respective constituencies. While both leaders are invested in the process and publicly recognize the need to support each other’s position, the PLO – as Peres accurately expressed it – doesn’t have so much to give; and Rabin’s government seems to be afraid of giving more than it has already.
The product of this rather weak recipe has been an unpalatable stew.
In the days following the Cairo signing the Israeli press glowed with approval, noting that Israel got everything it wanted – control of all security arrangements – while making few and primarily symbolic concessions. The Arab and Palestinian press simultaneously chafed at the insult of what were described as the “humiliating agreements.”
Palestinian and Israeli extremists sense this weakness, and have used violence and harsh rhetoric to further constrain their leaders by exacerbating tensions and preying on fears.
If left alone under this scenario, the Israeli and Palestinian negotiators cannot successfully complete an agreement which meets both parties’ minimal needs. Outside assistance, and specifically U.S. leadership, will be required to give each side the strength and support it needs to move forward.
While the U.S. has until now refused to become engaged in the negotiating process and will not place pressures on Israel to make concessions, there are still important actions the U.S. could take to greatly assist the parties and make the process work. Two such steps, outside of the negotiating process, come immediately to mind.
First, all parties have agreed that the question of Jerusalem will be left for final stage negotiations, and under the Madrid rules all parties agreed not to take unilateral steps to alter conditions on the ground during the negotiating process. Nevertheless, Israel fully acknowledges that it is constructing 15,000 new housing units (in addition to the 13,500 units begun by the Likud government which it is also completing) in what it describes as Greater Jerusalem – an expanded area stretching at some points more than 6 miles from the historic city.
This building, coupled with the “security roads” and tunnels that Israel is constructing to connect settlements with each other and Jerusalem, is cutting the West Bank into several separate cantons, and serves as a daily reminder to the Palestinians of their lack of control over their daily lives and sharpens their fear of never gaining any semblance of control over their territory.
A firm and public U.S. position against the construction within the occupied territories would enhance the integrity of the process and give the powerless Palestinians some sense of support in their quest for a just and lasting agreement.
Second, a continuing concern of the Palestinians has been their inability to gain direct access to foreign markets during the 27 years of Israeli occupation. A single U.S. announcement that the terms of the U.S.-Israel Free Trade Agreement would apply to Palestinian products exported from the autonomous regions would go a long way toward assuring Palestinians that they can benefit economically from peace.
There is an irony in the current process: in war the victor-vanquished equation applies, but in peace talks it is necessary that both parties emerge strengthened. As the Cairo accords make quite clear, negotiations within the context of the current Israeli-Palestinian relationship and the lack of outside support have served to enhance Israeli strength while further eroding the Palestinian position. But a weakened Palestinian authority will not and cannot produce peace.
Since both leaderships feel compelled to push the process forward, it may be possible for Israel to press the Palestinians to agree to their terms for autonomy and strip the Palestinians of even the trappings of sovereignty and dignity. But such an accord would be impossible for the PLO to sell to its already restless and angry constituency. In fact, such an agreement could only further weaken the PLO’s position in the territories, and is a recipe for continued conflict.
Israeli Environment Minister Yossi Sarid recognized this point when he suggested that forcing too many concessions from the Palestinians would weaken their ability to rally support for the negotiating process: “I think when we are talking about security matters, we have to twist the arms of our dialogue partners. But when we twist the arms, we have to be careful not to break them.”
While Rabin may feel unable to offer more to the Palestinians, the U.S. can, without directly entering the negotiations, take steps that will open up the current impasse. It is a role we cannot afford not to play – it will help not only the Palestinians but the Israelis and the peace process itself.
31 jan 1994
Builders for Peace (BFP), the American project launched by Vice President Al Gore to promote private investment in the West Bank and Gaza, has just completed a week-long visit to the Middle East.
The visit included stops in Tunisia, Jordan, the West Bank and Israel and was led by BFP’s co-Presidents, former U.S. Congressman Mel Levine and myself. While the major focus of the trip was designed to bring potential U.S. investors to meet with and develop ties with Palestinian partners, the BFP delegation also conducted briefing sessions with important regional political and business leaders and jointly sponsored a U.S.-Palestinian business roundtable discussion in Bethlehem with U.S. Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown.
During its week-long stay in the region, the BFP leadership met with PLO Chairman Yasir `Arafat, Tunisian Foreign Minister Habib Ben Yahia, leaders of the Tunisian, Jordanian and Israeli business communities, Israeli Minister of Industry and Trade Micah Harish, Palestinian officials in the West Bank and Gaza, and over 100 Palestinian business leaders from the Occupied Territories.
While the visit was met with widespread enthusiasm for investment and economic growth in the Palestinian lands; it also discovered real frustration with the slow pace of the peace process and fear that further stalemate would erode the support for the process that was generated by the September 13th events; and concern, especially among political leaders, that without real progress toward implementation of the accords, foreign economic involvement in the Palestinian territories will be stalled.
***
In Tunisia, we found the Foreign Minister to be fully supportive of bringing new private investment to the West Bank and Gaza. He was not only enthusiastic about the BFP program, but was also eager to see the Tunisian business community participate in tri-lateral U.S.-Tunisian-Palestinian ventures.
The Tunisian business leadership has already begun to explore business contacts in the Occupied Territories, and in a week’s time will be sending a delegation to the West Bank and Gaza to gain first-hand experience regarding the opportunities available to them, both in direct Tunisian-Palestinian joint ventures and also in Tunisian-Palestinian-Israeli economic projects.
In Tunisia, the BFP leadership met with PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat. While Arafat expressed his strong endorsement of BFP and praised the initiative launched by Vice President Gore, he also expressed the widespread Palestinian concern that without real progress on the political front, the entire peace process could unravel. Recognizing that genuine progress required movement on the economic front, he nevertheless focused his attention on the political problems currently being negotiated with the Israelis.
In an effort to make clear his strong support for BFP, Chairman Arafat delivered to the co-Presidents an endorsement which read, in part:
“I…commend the tireless efforts made by both of you personally in directing Builders for Peace so as to realize the objectives you set for strengthening bilateral relationships among us and for deepening economic and investment cooperation in the Palestinian Territories, especially so that you were successful in attracting a number of U.S. businessmen and investors to have interest in the Palestinian economy.
“I wish your…success…will contribute to furthering our efforts and those of our Palestinian people to establish economic and organic structures and institutions on the road to establishing a dynamic, vital and creative economy which will open up wide horizons for the creative capabilities of our people, and which will strengthen the confidence of friendly investors from other countries in the Palestinian economy.
”...Therefore, I appeal to all investors from the U.S.A. and the other friendly countries to invest in Palestine to revive the nascent Palestinian economy, because that will have a great influence on solidifying the basis of a just peace….”
The Jordanian business leadership was as eager as any group to begin investment in the West Bank and Gaza, but was a bit more jaded. Since many are Palestinians who own property, businesses or have other strong connections to the West Bank, they know first-hand the difficulties of doing business with the Israeli occupation authorities. The general consensus of these Jordanian business leaders with whom we met was that as long as the Declaration of Principles goes unimplemented, and the Israeli Administration in the territories and its regulatory regime stayed in control, investment in growing the Palestinian economy was not possible.
These Jordanian business leaders, while eager to renew their economic connection to the West Bank are not enthusiastic about doing so as long as they must deal with an Israeli occupation administration. Our discussions with them included reports of their frustrations with their separation from the West Bank and their past dealings with Israeli authorities. They reported confiscations of family-owned land, long waits for or denials of building permits, denials of licenses and the absence of banking institutions (due to Israeli closure of Jordanian banks in the territories) as reasons for their concern.
Nevertheless, in part because of their personal connections to the West Bank, and because these businessmen sense real investment possibilities, they were eager to work with BFP to form joint partnerships to promote growth and regional economic cooperation.
These sober yet hopeful assessments did not prepare us for the attitudes we discovered among the Palestinian business leaders we met in our three days of meetings in Jerusalem and Bethlehem. These meetings were the centerpiece of our visit and brought together our BFP leadership and a delegation of 20 American businessmen and over 100 Palestinians from a variety of economic sectors in the West Bank and Gaza. The meetings were organized by sector, including separate roundtable discussions representing the following groups:
--· leather and footwear,
--· garments,
--· handicrafts,
--· tourism,
--· manufacturing, and
--· pharmaceuticals.
What was most striking about these meetings was the difference between the attitudes these Palestinians had toward economic prospects and those shared by their political leadership both inside and outside the territories. They came ready to do business and saw no reason to delay in developing joint ventures. They understood that the need to make progress on the political front and they realized all the hardships imposed upon economic activity by the Israeli regulatory regime – but these businessmen and women had worked with this regime in the past and succeeded despite it.
Despite the burdens and the inequities of Israeli policy, despite the absence of capital and access to markets, the Palestinian business community creatively adapted itself to its harsh environment, employs thousands, produces a wide variety of goods and services and became economically viable. They urged the U.S. businessmen to invest now so as to bring the fruits of peace quickly to the territories and assist them in achieving economic independence and building their own economic infrastructure.
Even before BFP left Jerusalem, U.S. investors had begun to develop partnerships with Palestinian businessmen. And in the week since the completion of the mission, major agreements are being worked out in textiles, bottling beverages, pharmaceuticals and handicrafts.
U.S. commitment to BFP and to American investment in the West Bank and Gaza remains high. One of the final events of the BFP visit to the West Bank and Gaza was a business roundtable in Bethlehem. The event was co-sponsored by BFP and U.S. Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown – a clear indication of the Clinton Administration’s support for promoting economic relations between the Palestinian and U.S. business communities. Speaking to the 20 American and 30 Palestinian leaders assembled at the roundtable, Secretary Brown praised the Palestinian private sector. Reporting on what he had seen in his short stay in the region, he noted, “The talent, energy and vision is there – if we remove the obstacles, it will flourish.”
And speaking on his return to the U.S., just two days later at the Arab American Institute’s conference in Washington, Secretary Brown elaborated on his views that the Palestinian business community needed to be supported immediately. He said:
”...as Secretary of Commerce, my principle focus is how we can create economic opportunity, how can we create economic growth, how can we create jobs so that people can take care of the basic needs of their families, and that is particularly the case in the West Bank and Gaza.
“I know we talk about the peace process on this track, and economic opportunity on another track. I think they are inextricably tied together.
“As the prospects for peace become more apparent, the expectations of people are raised. We have to do everything we can to meet those expectations. They are only going to be met through economic development; they are only going to be met through jobs; they are only going to be met through economic opportunity; and I think we have to find a way to get the political discussion and the economic discussion moving at the same time. And that is why I spent a good deal of time trying to convince American businessman and women to that they ought to be investing and forming commercial and economic relationships, not only throughout the region, but in particular in those areas of the region that need the most help, specifically the West Bank and Gaza. And, believe it or not, there is some response to that.
And later, in the same speech, the Secretary said,
“I think there are people who want to see change, who understand that occupation of the territories is unacceptable, who understand that the disparity in the lives of human beings is unacceptable, who understand that people of goodwill have to step in and try to make a difference.
One of the things that concerned me was that too often the business leaders were way ahead of the political leaders. The business leaders seemed to understand what this was all about: this is about changing lives. The political leaders were saying, `No, we have to dot every I and cross every t before we can get on with economic development.’
I think that’s nonsense. I think there is no time to waste. I think we have to start dealing with these real issues while we seek a final peace settlement. I don’t think you can ask people to keep suffering while too much posturing and focus on symbolism goes on and not enough focus is on what is happening to human lives. And I’m encouraged that there is a growing consensus, and that is why `Builders for Peace’ is having such growing success.”
The visit included stops in Tunisia, Jordan, the West Bank and Israel and was led by BFP’s co-Presidents, former U.S. Congressman Mel Levine and myself. While the major focus of the trip was designed to bring potential U.S. investors to meet with and develop ties with Palestinian partners, the BFP delegation also conducted briefing sessions with important regional political and business leaders and jointly sponsored a U.S.-Palestinian business roundtable discussion in Bethlehem with U.S. Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown.
During its week-long stay in the region, the BFP leadership met with PLO Chairman Yasir `Arafat, Tunisian Foreign Minister Habib Ben Yahia, leaders of the Tunisian, Jordanian and Israeli business communities, Israeli Minister of Industry and Trade Micah Harish, Palestinian officials in the West Bank and Gaza, and over 100 Palestinian business leaders from the Occupied Territories.
While the visit was met with widespread enthusiasm for investment and economic growth in the Palestinian lands; it also discovered real frustration with the slow pace of the peace process and fear that further stalemate would erode the support for the process that was generated by the September 13th events; and concern, especially among political leaders, that without real progress toward implementation of the accords, foreign economic involvement in the Palestinian territories will be stalled.
***
In Tunisia, we found the Foreign Minister to be fully supportive of bringing new private investment to the West Bank and Gaza. He was not only enthusiastic about the BFP program, but was also eager to see the Tunisian business community participate in tri-lateral U.S.-Tunisian-Palestinian ventures.
The Tunisian business leadership has already begun to explore business contacts in the Occupied Territories, and in a week’s time will be sending a delegation to the West Bank and Gaza to gain first-hand experience regarding the opportunities available to them, both in direct Tunisian-Palestinian joint ventures and also in Tunisian-Palestinian-Israeli economic projects.
In Tunisia, the BFP leadership met with PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat. While Arafat expressed his strong endorsement of BFP and praised the initiative launched by Vice President Gore, he also expressed the widespread Palestinian concern that without real progress on the political front, the entire peace process could unravel. Recognizing that genuine progress required movement on the economic front, he nevertheless focused his attention on the political problems currently being negotiated with the Israelis.
In an effort to make clear his strong support for BFP, Chairman Arafat delivered to the co-Presidents an endorsement which read, in part:
“I…commend the tireless efforts made by both of you personally in directing Builders for Peace so as to realize the objectives you set for strengthening bilateral relationships among us and for deepening economic and investment cooperation in the Palestinian Territories, especially so that you were successful in attracting a number of U.S. businessmen and investors to have interest in the Palestinian economy.
“I wish your…success…will contribute to furthering our efforts and those of our Palestinian people to establish economic and organic structures and institutions on the road to establishing a dynamic, vital and creative economy which will open up wide horizons for the creative capabilities of our people, and which will strengthen the confidence of friendly investors from other countries in the Palestinian economy.
”...Therefore, I appeal to all investors from the U.S.A. and the other friendly countries to invest in Palestine to revive the nascent Palestinian economy, because that will have a great influence on solidifying the basis of a just peace….”
The Jordanian business leadership was as eager as any group to begin investment in the West Bank and Gaza, but was a bit more jaded. Since many are Palestinians who own property, businesses or have other strong connections to the West Bank, they know first-hand the difficulties of doing business with the Israeli occupation authorities. The general consensus of these Jordanian business leaders with whom we met was that as long as the Declaration of Principles goes unimplemented, and the Israeli Administration in the territories and its regulatory regime stayed in control, investment in growing the Palestinian economy was not possible.
These Jordanian business leaders, while eager to renew their economic connection to the West Bank are not enthusiastic about doing so as long as they must deal with an Israeli occupation administration. Our discussions with them included reports of their frustrations with their separation from the West Bank and their past dealings with Israeli authorities. They reported confiscations of family-owned land, long waits for or denials of building permits, denials of licenses and the absence of banking institutions (due to Israeli closure of Jordanian banks in the territories) as reasons for their concern.
Nevertheless, in part because of their personal connections to the West Bank, and because these businessmen sense real investment possibilities, they were eager to work with BFP to form joint partnerships to promote growth and regional economic cooperation.
These sober yet hopeful assessments did not prepare us for the attitudes we discovered among the Palestinian business leaders we met in our three days of meetings in Jerusalem and Bethlehem. These meetings were the centerpiece of our visit and brought together our BFP leadership and a delegation of 20 American businessmen and over 100 Palestinians from a variety of economic sectors in the West Bank and Gaza. The meetings were organized by sector, including separate roundtable discussions representing the following groups:
--· leather and footwear,
--· garments,
--· handicrafts,
--· tourism,
--· manufacturing, and
--· pharmaceuticals.
What was most striking about these meetings was the difference between the attitudes these Palestinians had toward economic prospects and those shared by their political leadership both inside and outside the territories. They came ready to do business and saw no reason to delay in developing joint ventures. They understood that the need to make progress on the political front and they realized all the hardships imposed upon economic activity by the Israeli regulatory regime – but these businessmen and women had worked with this regime in the past and succeeded despite it.
Despite the burdens and the inequities of Israeli policy, despite the absence of capital and access to markets, the Palestinian business community creatively adapted itself to its harsh environment, employs thousands, produces a wide variety of goods and services and became economically viable. They urged the U.S. businessmen to invest now so as to bring the fruits of peace quickly to the territories and assist them in achieving economic independence and building their own economic infrastructure.
Even before BFP left Jerusalem, U.S. investors had begun to develop partnerships with Palestinian businessmen. And in the week since the completion of the mission, major agreements are being worked out in textiles, bottling beverages, pharmaceuticals and handicrafts.
U.S. commitment to BFP and to American investment in the West Bank and Gaza remains high. One of the final events of the BFP visit to the West Bank and Gaza was a business roundtable in Bethlehem. The event was co-sponsored by BFP and U.S. Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown – a clear indication of the Clinton Administration’s support for promoting economic relations between the Palestinian and U.S. business communities. Speaking to the 20 American and 30 Palestinian leaders assembled at the roundtable, Secretary Brown praised the Palestinian private sector. Reporting on what he had seen in his short stay in the region, he noted, “The talent, energy and vision is there – if we remove the obstacles, it will flourish.”
And speaking on his return to the U.S., just two days later at the Arab American Institute’s conference in Washington, Secretary Brown elaborated on his views that the Palestinian business community needed to be supported immediately. He said:
”...as Secretary of Commerce, my principle focus is how we can create economic opportunity, how can we create economic growth, how can we create jobs so that people can take care of the basic needs of their families, and that is particularly the case in the West Bank and Gaza.
“I know we talk about the peace process on this track, and economic opportunity on another track. I think they are inextricably tied together.
“As the prospects for peace become more apparent, the expectations of people are raised. We have to do everything we can to meet those expectations. They are only going to be met through economic development; they are only going to be met through jobs; they are only going to be met through economic opportunity; and I think we have to find a way to get the political discussion and the economic discussion moving at the same time. And that is why I spent a good deal of time trying to convince American businessman and women to that they ought to be investing and forming commercial and economic relationships, not only throughout the region, but in particular in those areas of the region that need the most help, specifically the West Bank and Gaza. And, believe it or not, there is some response to that.
And later, in the same speech, the Secretary said,
“I think there are people who want to see change, who understand that occupation of the territories is unacceptable, who understand that the disparity in the lives of human beings is unacceptable, who understand that people of goodwill have to step in and try to make a difference.
One of the things that concerned me was that too often the business leaders were way ahead of the political leaders. The business leaders seemed to understand what this was all about: this is about changing lives. The political leaders were saying, `No, we have to dot every I and cross every t before we can get on with economic development.’
I think that’s nonsense. I think there is no time to waste. I think we have to start dealing with these real issues while we seek a final peace settlement. I don’t think you can ask people to keep suffering while too much posturing and focus on symbolism goes on and not enough focus is on what is happening to human lives. And I’m encouraged that there is a growing consensus, and that is why `Builders for Peace’ is having such growing success.”
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